Fight's On! The origins of TOPGUN and dogfights back in the day/future prospects

[Steve Wilkins]

If by famous you mean universally discredited and scoffed at by those in the IR field, then yeah. "Clash" is a hack job.

Brett

Universally??....or just discredited by some of the folks on the right. Come on now, Brett, for someone who abhors generalizations, saying something is "universally discredited" is unbecoming. Surely you have more to go on.

 

[scoober78]

If by famous you mean universally discredited and scoffed at by those in the IR field, then yeah. "Clash" is a hack job.

Hate to say it...but that's just not the case. Although the concept taken holistically is certainly no "grand theory", he makes points that are hard to ignore. It's also the single most cited piece of IR writing in the last 20 years. Hard to call it discredited if everyone is still reading and writing on it. My advisor called it a reverse baby & the bathwater scenario...

Just because some of his conclusions are wrong...even downright laughable...don't throw the bathwater out with the baby. There is alot of value in that work.

 

[Huggy Bear]

Much easier? I don't think that 'widom':icon_mi_1 was ever implied. Warfare is never "easy", be it with rock and sling, broadsword, cannon or the latest high-tech weapons…it's never even remotely, "easy." But it can definitely be different, depending upon many factors.

The earlier point was made that, for those who have had the experience, a guns kill was more satisfying for them than a missile kill, because it relied a little less on technology and a little more on their basic flying skills – (even with lead-computing gun sights). Also, because the guns envelope was so small, flying to it was perhaps more difficult and thus more satisfying. (Same with Air-to-Ground: A Zero CEP with an old iron bombsight is much more difficult and thus more personally gratifying than the same CEP with a computerized ballistic drop, which is in turn more satisfying than an LGB or smart-weapon drop….Note, not better or desired, just more personally satisfying because it depends more upon "personal" skill. Most will enjoy the added challenge if it's available, and warranted - just like hands-on landings vs. auto-land.)



"Sensory overload" is an entirely different subject than weapons employment. And I'm not sure who the "they" were, to whom you refer. Earlier, and less advanced radars and sensors produced similar problems for the operator. Further, Fallon and Red Flag are an excellent exercises, but they still can't quite duplicate the real thing, or provide quite the same, "sensory overload," irrespective of technology.

Back in the day of 30 plane Alpha Strikes, it was not uncommon to have - and overwhelmingly, all at once – smoke trails above you from friendly Shrikes; aimed and barrage fire AAA tracers zinging through the formation, detonating above/below/around you; 30 unstable and jinking aircraft that you tried hard not to mid-air with; "Deep Sea" on Guard constantly yelling in your headsets loudly, "SAM, SAM, vicinity of ___"; Red Crown or the E-2 sometimes calling multiple "Bandits" in various sectors; chaff and bright flares being punched out by various aircraft just ahead, and whizzing right by you (along with the enemy tracers); "trying to tune and re-tune temperamental missiles; a confusing array of switchology to set up just right for bombs and missiles; sudden 30-plane formation discipline disintegration, as a couple of SAM's go right through the formation; 30 plane's struggling to rejoin; trying to get set up for the strike and finding it weathered in; having to go to your alternate target; along with more loud SAM calls on Guard, and Bandit Calls, now you start hearing the "Beeper on Guard" as one of your 30 has just been shot down; who was it?; looking at your RHAW indications and seeing AAA from all quadrants, and SAM's from two quadrants; having to listen to the multiple and repeated – and extremely loud - cockpit aural warnings of SAM launches and flashing red lights; start hearing SAR efforts on Guard; listening to unnecessary chatter on the Strike Frequency, listening to flights aborting for various mechanical reasons, listening to someone who lost the strike group, and all this before even reaching the target, taking a vector, or firing one missile.

There were occasions where there were so many flashing and solid enemy strobes from all directions, and constant and repeated, loud aural warning tones and warbles of many multiple SAM launches or even SAM guidance, we just turned off the RHAW gear so we didn't have to listen to those loud and many threats, which only added to the cacophony. Not smart maybe, but a definite example and honest result of what you term, "sensory overload."

And the threshold for sensory overload is very much lowered on the 10th month of a cruise, after you stood an alert-5 in the middle of the night, have a touch of the flu, spent part of the night planning, and did a similar mission the day before.

No generation of warriors has a monopoly on sensory overload - neither today's, tomorrow's, nor yesterday's. While I have indeed experienced sensory overload in the "real world", I suspect it may have been even greater for the WWII guys, even if their technological tools were far less. Until you have been shot at in anger, you haven't experienced real sensory overload either.

Don't take my first sentence to mean anything you said CAT. I belong to a ww2 warbirds forum as well and there is frequently a dogpile thread about how much touhger it was in the olden days and modern pilots have it so easy now due to xyz.

I never said that yesterdays pilots had it easy or easier than we do, I was making the point that today's pilots don't have it neccessarily better because the technology is better. A lot of folks don't get that.

Good point about the sensory overload of vietnam. It doesn't take technology to saturate your noodle. Hell, even ww1 pilots were saturated just keeping track of all those planes and fixing those unreliable guns.

 

[TurnandBurn55]

If by famous you mean universally discredited and scoffed at by those in the IR field, then yeah. "Clash" is a hack job.

True statement. I knew a couple profs who used to teach at Harvard, and they all said Huntington was a guy who just came up with a lot of grandiose ideas behind his desk... most research and statistical analysis debunked all his assertions. His contention that "Islam has bloody borders" is the only exception.

A4s-- unfortunately, Clausewitz is misinterpreted in this day and age. We're always looking for the climactic battle and the chance to plant our flag on the enemy ramparts. What we miss is the "center of gravity" in these low-intensity wars is not measured in body counts but rather in political will. There's a reason we've got a lousy track record in counterinsurgency (Vietnam? Beirut? Somalia? Iraq?)...

Good reading on the subject:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0226567702?v=glance
http://www.amazon.com/Sling-Stone-W...=pd_bxgy_b_text_b/103-0805260-2366204?ie=UTF8
http://www.amazon.com/Vietnam-Neces...=pd_bbs_1/103-0805260-2366204?ie=UTF8&s=books

 

[Steve Wilkins]

A4s-- unfortunately, Clausewitz is misinterpreted in this day and age. We're always looking for the climactic battle and the chance to plant our flag on the enemy ramparts. What we miss is the "center of gravity" in these low-intensity wars is not measured in body counts but rather in political will.

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/2003/winter/art4-w03.htm

 

[A4sForever]

.... unfortunately, Clausewitz is misinterpreted in this day and age. We're always looking for the climactic battle and the chance to plant our flag on the enemy ramparts. What we miss is the "center of gravity" in these low-intensity wars is not measured in body counts but rather in political will. There's a reason we've got a lousy track record in counterinsurgency (Vietnam? Beirut? Somalia? Iraq?).....

Yeah. Absolutely. That's a big problem with current military doctrine ... looking for the "big battle" that may never come -- unless it's China or nuke Iran. Clausewitz dealt with CONSTANTS of war, however, and talked little about the developing technology of the day (my original point) in his treatise(s).

Like Mao ...

You don't need a B-2 or a DDX or an F-22 to win a war of ideas.

Our current attempts to fight every fight as seen through technology-colored glasses are doomed to failure in the end. The Rumsfeld/Pentagon lust for "transformation" of the U.S. military (from what?? to what ??? ) is another example of an overreliance on technology to carry the day. The objective goal of transforming "from" something only appears to be moving away "from" whatever we did in the past. And that, on face value, is not good enough ...

With our semi-monopoly on technology in warfare, wars are being fought and won more and more through psychological factors and WILL (your counterinsurgency/low-intensity examples). This is not the first time I've said it: SouthEast Asia --- study the Brits in Malaya and the French in IndoChina. Two diametrically opposite ways of fighting "insurgencies". One successful, the other -- a disaster.

And Iraq -- today? All the king's horses and all the king's men will not carry the day if, in the end, the WILL to win is lacking. That, as a country, as a policy, and as a developing culture within our populace, is the danger the U.S. faces today ...

My $20 worth ... :sleep_125

 

[scoober78]

To me the issue is how we define victory. Gulf I was clearcut because victory was removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The problem in Iraq to me is how we define the victory. Protecting the country from WMD's isn't an acheivable victory, removing Saddam Hussein from power is not a tenable end-state. With all due respect, the problem that I think we've run into is not in a lack of either will or means but in the lack of a clearly defined "state of victory." We need to know what it is we need to do to "win."

 

[Catmando]

Don't take my first sentence to mean anything you said CAT. I belong to a ww2 warbirds forum as well and there is frequently a dogpile thread about how much touhger it was in the olden days and modern pilots have it so easy now due to xyz.

Thanks, and I understand exactly now what you were saying.

I never said that yesterdays pilots had it easy or easier than we do, I was making the point that today's pilots don't have it neccessarily better because the technology is better. A lot of folks don't get that.

Very true, and I agree. Technology has indeed increased exponentially, the amount of valuable information available to the pilot. But one can only process so much, and too much information, despite its value at some point becomes counterproductive. (That's why I always liked to "de-clutter" my HUD ) And of course, warfare is never easy for anyone...even if some on another forum as you say, want to argue that.

 

[Catmando]

..........With our semi-monopoly on technology in warfare, wars are being fought and won more and more through psychological factors and WILL (your counterinsurgency/low-intensity examples). This is not the first time I've said it: SouthEast Asia --- study the Brits in Malaya and the French in IndoChina. Two diametrically opposite ways of fighting "insurgencies". One successful, the other -- a disaster........

Couldn't agree with you more. And in addition to the Counter Insurgency books by Hammes and Nagl that TurnandBurn55 recommended earlier, here is another: Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula. http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Warfare-Theory-Practice-Classics/dp/0275992691/sr=1-2/qid=1157339153/ref=pd_bbs_2/102-3853103-3483316?ie=UTF8&s=books Written in the '60's and well regarded, it has been out of print for 40 years! Now suddenly back in print by demand, it is a hot item and required reading at Army Staff College. That COIN has been so neglected for so long speaks volumes of our problems today.

 

[A4sForever]

To me the issue is how we define victory.

Negative. That's the Alice in Wonderland way of the world ... i.e., "reality is whatever we say it is"; "victory is whatever we say it is" ... victory is when you bring the other side to their knees. They grow weary. They reach the point of diminishing return. They quit. You annihilate them. Vanquish them. Reduce them to rubble. Grind them into fine white powder. We haven't had one of those lately because of a lack of will ....

Gulf I was clearcut .... victory

Negative ... if so, there would not have been a Gulf II and we wouldn't be in Baghdad tonight ... we could have ended Saddam in Gulf 1 ... the State Department decided he would be a great counter-balance to Iran. I believe that's call irony ...

The problem in Iraq to me is how we define the victory.

Negative ... see above....

Protecting the country from WMD's isn't an acheivable victory removing Saddam Hussein from power is not a tenable end-state.

Negative. And the guys should have dropped that grenade into Saddam's rat-hole ... he could have joined his psychotic sons in Paradise. That would have been a tenable end-state.

With all due respect,...

Purge that from your vocabulary ... play like that phrase doesn't exist ... 'cause what follows is usually offered "without respect"

We need to know what it is we need to do to "win."

You get half-credit for that one ... we "know" what it takes ... we just don't have the political or national will (guts?) to get it done ...

You need to demand a full refund from whatever professor(s) taught you the above. I will sign an affidavit for you ...

 

[TurnandBurn55]

To me the issue is how we define victory. Gulf I was clearcut because victory was removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

Heh.. the Gulf was clearcut because we set the bar high. We said it would cost us massive numbers of lives, that it would be a tough, hard-fought battle against the 4th-largest army in the world, hardened in 10 years of war, armed with front-line Soviet hardware and possibly chemical weapons. In short, we made it clear that our goals would NOT be easy to accomplish. When they turned out to be very easy, the victory was that much sweeter.

Compare the "it will be monumentally difficult" attitude in the leadup to the '91 War to the '03 war leadup.

 

[TurnandBurn55]

Very true, and I agree. Technology has indeed increased exponentially, the amount of valuable information available to the pilot. But one can only process so much, and too much information, despite its value at some point becomes counterproductive.

That is a problem. I've never been in combat or to Red Flag, but I've seen a few LFEs, and the amount of information you can put on your displays (especially with Link-16) becomes ridiculous. If you've got a lot of very proficient guys, having these toys is awesome... it allows new and very creative tactics.

Otherwise? It's another thing to spend in the line slamming your head against. It's unnecessary comm between your flight elements to make it work. It's more comm with AIC to make it work. It's a sensory overload and a display management nightmare to get the information you NEED at a given point.

As the Reverend A4s might say... there's no substitute for the basics. Form-Radar-Comms.

 

[scoober78]

... victory is when you bring the other side to their knees. They grow weary. They reach the point of diminishing return. They quit. You annihilate them. Vanquish them. Reduce them to rubble. Grind them into fine white powder.

This is true, but only in complete warfare...warfare where national survival (either yours or your allies) is at stake. Clausewitz even suggests this in his often misquoted statement..."War is politics...." Half the point is that we can define our own objectives....impose our own will. We don't need to grind our opponents into dust, we need to impose our will...whatever that is...be it getting out of Kuwait or maintaining a democratic South Vietnam.

Negative ... if so, there would not have been a Gulf II and we wouldn't be in Baghdad tonight ... we could have ended Saddam in Gulf

To borrow your phrase, "see above". No one denies, except maybe Saddam himself, that we could have prevented Gulf II in Gulf I. The entire point is, that it wasn't in our political will at the time....and so...

the State Department decided he would be a great counter-balance to Iran.

Got nothing...that was a bad call...someone blew it.

we just don't have the political or national will (guts?) to get it done ...

Totally agree here. The problem is that we as a nation don't have the stomach to stay the course. Look at the turn in public sentiment from the begining of Gulf II to now. Public support goes from overwhelmingly for...to heavily against...why is a question that I feel everyone on a picket line should be forced to answer. Are we really so naieve as a nation to have not seen where an invasion of Iraq would lead?

You need to demand a full refund from whatever professor(s) taught you the above.

That'd would be great....about 100000$ the taxpayers would love to have back. Not that it wasn't a good education but (and I quote Will Hunting here...) "It's one I could have gotten for 6.79$ in late fees at the public library." That damn paper the Navy wanted me to get...that was the expensive part....:icon_wink

 

[pourts]

You get half-credit for that one ... we "know" what it takes ... we just don't have the political or national will (guts?) to get it done ...

So, what does it take, sir? I assume you are talking about a draft? Please correct me if you meant something else.

Also, I think there is a difference between tech geared toward fighting counter-insurgency, and tech geared toward balancing among other states. For example, IED disrupters, scanners for weapons/explosives vs. Crusader artillery system (canceled), etc. "Transformation" may have gone too far (I have no idea), but all technology isn't necessarily the same and therefore inapplicable to the current conflict.

 

[thull]

my 02

victory in Iraq = squelch the insurgency...provide a safe atmosphere/environment for the Iraqi economy to grow, followed by or in step with a solid political infrastructure, and continue to grow Iraqi military/police forces until they can actually fully handle the country on their own. THEN begin to withdraw.

How? we need half a million troops over there NOW. may seem drastic, but in the long run will save time/lives/cash. Let's get r dun.

lets see where this lands me...