Hot new helicopter/rotorcraft news

[Flash]

More pics - Student Naval Aviators in the Royal Navy helo pipeline doing just fine on Tucano ----> H135 track! Not breaking the budget, producing world class helicopter pilots, doing just fine not doing touchdown autos, etc.

Are you selling something?

 

[ChuckMK23]

Are you selling something?

No horse in this race, no dog in this fight. Other than genuinely would like to see training in the helo community evolve From its current state of stagnation and 1960s era approach to training

 

[wink]

So, all this talk about full touch down autos vs rolling on power. Reminds me of the spin requirement debate in FW private pilot training.

Just how many autos is the Navy seeing in the fleet these days? Is it necessary to train to full down autos when the chance of it happening is below a certain likelihood? If you screw up the last few feet of an actual auto because of unrealistic negative training rolling on power, how likely is it that will kill ya?

 

[IKE]

So, all this talk about full touch down autos vs rolling on power. Reminds me of the spin requirement debate in FW private pilot training.

Just how many autos is the Navy seeing in the fleet these days? Is it necessary to train to full down autos when the chance of it happening is below a certain likelihood? If you screw up the last few feet of an actual auto because of unrealistic negative training rolling on power, how likely is it that will kill ya?

In the -60, it's more like 30 ft, not a few. Also, the power recovery is well known to be negative training in the Hawks. The adverse yaw is rightward with power and leftward in a real auto, and the required collective pull is far less (magnitude and rate) with power.

I'd like to hear from the East Coast HSC Skipper who auto'ed the Hotel into the Pacific or the HSC-12 pilot who put the Sierra down in Japan as to what degree their TH-57 training had an effect on their real-world saving of the day. Not having done a real auto, I don't feel qualified to fully answer, but I can say I felt MUCH better in my ability to auto the OH-58 than the UH-72 while at TPS.

 

[DanMa1156]

While I am willing to move away or at least debate the need for full autos, when you think of it less as a way to learn a fundamental helicopter skill in an engine out/tail rotor failure/other scenario, you can think of it instead as a good scan drill - it forces the SNA to look outside to maintain a track and coordinate how much flare and pull are required, while maintaining a difficult-to-master inside scan of attitude, airspeed, ball, and Nr.

 

[wink]

In the -60, it's more like 30 ft, not a few. Also, the power recovery is well known to be negative training in the Hawks. The adverse yaw is rightward with power and leftward in a real auto, and the required collective pull is far less (magnitude and rate) with power.

I'd like to hear from the East Coast HSC Skipper who auto'ed the Hotel into the Pacific or the HSC-12 pilot who put the Sierra down in Japan as to what degree their TH-57 training had an effect on their real-world saving of the day. Not having done a real auto, I don't feel qualified to fully answer, but I can say I felt MUCH better in my ability to auto the OH-58 than the UH-72 while at TPS.

To clarify, in all your years, even as a TPS grad, you have heard of two actual emergency autos? And, not to nit pick or require one to look into a crystal ball, are those 30 feet going to kill you, or will they allow you space to fix stepping on the wrong pedal or to pull the collective a good bit more? Not a rotor qualed pilot. Just was around them a lot and have ridden through some full autos (practice). Had a retired O-6 Army aviator demo an auto for me in an OH-58 where he had enough Nr left to lift up after touchdown and move the aircraft around. Also had a former Army aviator in the same agency do a full auto and smacked the tail hard enough to cause strike damage. He was told not to come back. Great guy. A B757 pilot for ATA. Died in a night NVG CFIT mishap flying a helo in a retirement job.

 

[Jim123]

There were at least two or three in the history of the 60B, one where the tail rotor seized or lost drive (form flight and -2 saw it happen, maybe it wasn’t a B though), one where either then IGB or TGB seized after somebody had mis-serviced it with hydraulic fluid, and one with a dual flameout (engine controls mis-rigged and shot right to overspeed protection when the pilot put the collective down for a practice auto).

I think those are more or less the correct details. I’ve forgotten if there were any other events.

 

[phrogdriver]

The auto debate is a valid one. Are autos the end-all-be-all? No. Are they useful? Undeniably.

More important is the insane cost of a twin versus a single both in acquisition cost and in maintenance cost. Do you think that the Navy will buy the same number of aircraft if they cost 40% more? Do you think the syllabus will keep the same number of flight hours if each hour costs 45% more to support?

 

[ChuckMK23]

The auto debate is a valid one. Are autos the end-all-be-all? No. Are they useful? Undeniably.

More important is the insane cost of a twin versus a single both in acquisition cost and in maintenance cost. Do you think that the Navy will buy the same number of aircraft if they cost 40% more? Do you think the syllabus will keep the same number of flight hours if each hour costs 45% more to support?

Similar arguments raised when JPATS became T-6.

We are not a resource constrained military.

The cost of twin vs single are small minded problems. There are resources to overcome that. Time to stop the company grade thinking. The undergraduate helo pipeline is broke - the solutions are not evolutionary steps.

 

[ChuckMK23]

5 years from now you all will be thinking how irresponsible it was to train in the TH-57 as long as we did...and likely how moronic we were for doing it in a light analog equipped single engine helo.

I’m reminded by the guy in the 50’s who said there was need for maybe 10 computers in the world....

 

[wink]

@phrogdriver What did Baltimore have you doing wrt autos? Did you ever hear or see the story being told by the Columbus OH PD pilot who had an engine failure at night unaided in a MD 500 (?) over the city? Awesome story. Came down in a preplanned area he had driven every month or so to become familiar with it. Just two lanes with street parking. Street lights on just one side of the street. He touched down on one side of the street to avoid the street lights, then directed the sliding aircraft to the center of the street spinning rotors just under the lights to avoid parked cars and a guy on a bike. Good story. Good lessons. He always flew nights. Practiced autos (power on) 2-3 times a week for years. His agency allowed full down autos at requals. Had pre-identified several forced landing spots along the patrol route he flew over the city. Routinely drove each one day and night to memorize the details. Saw the pilot present at a public use aircraft safety stand down about 5 years ago.

 

[RobLyman]

There were at least two or three in the history of the 60B, one where the tail rotor seized or lost drive (form flight and -2 saw it happen, maybe it wasn’t a B though), one where either then IGB or TGB seized after somebody had mis-serviced it with hydraulic fluid, and one with a dual flameout (engine controls mis-rigged and shot right to overspeed protection when the pilot put the collective down for a practice auto).

I think those are more or less the correct details. I’ve forgotten if there were any other events.

Oil cooler spline failure. It was an HSL-40 60B in 1986/87ish. Aircraft drifted left at the bottom because MMU puts in left cyclic to counter the translating tendencies of the tail rotor thrust, which was zero in this case. Left drift on touchdown in soft dirt caused the left strut to break and the aircraft to roll over. Everyone got out. It was a flight of three. Pilot reported that dash 3 said over the radio, "Dash 2, your tail rotor stopped turning." I was a student at HSL-40 when it happened. I later deployed with one of the pilots.

HSL-44 a few years later (1988 or 89) had a dual engine failure caused by a misdiagnosed engine malfunction. I don't remember the details other than they were out over the water near Maine when it happened. Once over land, both engines failed or went low side upon initiating a descent. I was in HSL-44 when this occurred, but I don't know/remember as much about it.

 

[Gatordev]

There was also the dual engine failure (I believe it was dual Np Overspeed) on a FCF in 2001-02 in the gulf. I can't remember which coast it was, but I think it was East.

To clarify, in all your years, even as a TPS grad, you have heard of two actual emergency autos? And, not to nit pick or require one to look into a crystal ball, are those 30 feet going to kill you, or will they allow you space to fix stepping on the wrong pedal or to pull the collective a good bit more? Not a rotor qualed pilot. Just was around them a lot and have ridden through some full autos (practice).

Wink, as others have said, debating autos is worth a discussion, but you can't equate doing autos in a Bell 206/407 to doing one in a -60. They are very different, in part because they are so much heavier.

To answer your question, yes, that 30 feet will kill you, specifically with lateral drift. And that's assuming you've done it correctly and are at that 30 feet. More autos than not done by fleet pilots aren't pretty.

I'm with @DanMa1156 , it's worthy of a debate, but much of the value of autos is learning the airwork and getting a feel for the aircraft, regardless of airframe.

Also, I'm sure phrogdriver will comment with what he saw, but for my company, full-autos to the deck are part of the -135 checkride for the 407. At night, on goggles from the 180.

 

[Griz882]

There were at least two or three in the history of the 60B, one where the tail rotor seized or lost drive (form flight and -2 saw it happen, maybe it wasn’t a B though), one where either then IGB or TGB seized after somebody had mis-serviced it with hydraulic fluid, and one with a dual flameout (engine controls mis-rigged and shot right to overspeed protection when the pilot put the collective down for a practice auto).

I think those are more or less the correct details. I’ve forgotten if there were any other events.

Four or five years ago a national guard UH-60 had a blade de-laminate at 6000 feet. The crew managed a full auto into a cornfield.

 

[wink]

Wasn't equating an OH-58 auto with a -60. It was just a point of referance. And I am truly interested in the debate, both sides.

My inclination would be to train realisticly. That seems to be the position of fleet guys here. But does it have to be in the aircraft? I know it isn't an option for the current remaining system due to age, but are contemporary sims up to the task? Can the -60 sim give good training in autos to touchdown? Wouldn't the new primary training system include sims with this capability?