NEWS If War Comes, Will the U.S. Navy Be Prepared?

[DanMa1156]

You want to know one thing the Navy did to "fix" the Fitz/Mccain problems?

They decided to hire 20-30 retired SWO O-6s as GS-15s to "mentor" the current waterfront. I wish I was joking.

There is A LOT more to it than that (and I'm assuming what you're saying is true). Pre Fitz and McCain, INDOPACOM ordered PACFLT to source a ship for [INSERT PREVIOUSLY UNSOURCED UNKNOWN ABOUT MISSION HERE]. PACFLT would order 7th Fleet and would say "we don't have a ship available for the missions you want." PACFLT would come back and say "USS DDG/CG is in the Yards/Basic Phase/CODT, use them!" This means there are dedicated and absolutely protected maintenance and training for ships there now.

Post Fitz/McCain, 7th Fleet won't even name the ships in the yards and will absolutely refuse to use them. Why? Perhaps because you didn't guess it, an Admiral got fired!

In my humble opinion, I think there was a lot of room that Admiral Swift should also have been fired, although he didn't leave under the best circumstances either, despite being in a job that typically leads to becoming INDOPACOM.

A SWO can correct me if I'm wrong, but they also have a logbook system now that requires a certain amount of bridge time and types and reps of specific evolutions to get sign offs for their various quals (at least the last ship I was on ran it that way; I assume that's fairly standardized).

PS @SELRES_AMDO - none of the aforementioned admirals are Academy grads...

 

[nittany03]

I hope the Chinese are even more disorganized than we are. In the old days, the Russians usually were.

A quote I'll always remember from when I was a JO: " . . . it's not that we're the greatest military in the world. We just suck less than everyone else."

 

[nodropinufaka]

On a serious note and back to the topic.

Is the push to have officers qualified as Joint Qualified Officers a hinderance?

I constantly saw LCDRs or CDRs coming through the CCMD for 23 months to get their credit in a JDAL billet and move on. The problem was they didn't really do a lot in the command except be a work horse for the O-6's throughout the command and the civilians there seemed to be the continuity anyway.

Is that beneficial to take leaders out of the fleet for that long in the name of joint ness?

 

[nittany03]

On a serious note and back to the topic.

Is the push to have officers qualified as Joint Qualified Officers a hinderance?

I constantly saw LCDRs or CDRs coming through the CCMD for 23 months to get their credit in a JDAL billet and move on. The problem was they didn't really do a lot in the command except be a work horse for the O-6's throughout the command and the civilians there seemed to be the continuity anyway.

Is that beneficial to take leaders out of the fleet for that long in the name of joint ness?

The reason that JQOs are required is because before Goldwater-Nichols, the services didn't value joint time, were sending no-loads and broken toys to staff joint commands, and it was hindering the ability to operate as a Joint Force. Rice bowls, parochialism, etc. Congress via Goldwater-Nichols essentially forced the military to send due-course officers to do joint tours and play nice with each other. But this meant that you had to limit folks' time in JDAL billets so you could cycle through everyone who needed one. Ideal? Maybe, maybe not. But there's a reason it happened, grounded in the buffoonery and shenanigans of the past.

 

[Jim123]

It benefits the entire force (speaking of history, in WWII the Japanese Army and Navy were not that great at working together, and that was part of their undoing). It's a tradeoff between tactical excellence in the operating forces and growing your officer corps to understand the big picture.

"Joint" usually seems to mean "the Army way" anyway. JOPES, R2P2, Army planning, those are all verrrry similar. The Army has a lot of mnemonics and made up acronyms for company level stuff, but you're not drilling down that deep when you're doing joint stuff.

Something in favor of "jointness" is that militarily we've always been much better than most countries out there at operational level warfare. What that means in day to day terms is that your frontline forces don't run out of stuff in a war. What it means at the national level is that we can actually do power projection, like sail halfway around the world and be a force to be reckoned with (speaking of Japanese history, the deployment of the Russian Baltic fleet was a great example of how fail at this- I mean in the operational sense, not necessarily in exactly how the battle played out).

 

[nittany03]

It benefits the entire force (speaking of history, in WWII the Japanese Army and Navy were not that great at working together, and that was part of their undoing). It's a tradeoff between tactical excellence in the operating forces and growing your officer corps to understand the big picture.

"Joint" usually seems to mean "the Army way" anyway. JOPES, R2P2, Army planning, those are all verrrry similar. The Army has a lot of mnemonics and made up acronyms for company level stuff, but you're not drilling down that deep when you're doing joint stuff.

Something in favor of "jointness" is that militarily we've always been much better than most countries out there at operational level warfare. What that means in day to day terms is that your frontline forces don't run out of stuff in a war. What it means at the national level is that we can actually do power projection, like sail halfway around the world and be a force to be reckoned with (speaking of Japanese history, the deployment of the Russian Baltic fleet was a great example of how fail at this- I mean in the operational sense, not necessarily in exactly how the battle played out).

And where we historically suck out loud is tying together OLW and theater-strategic objectives with national-strategic objectives. The American way of war is to be operationally excellent, and hope the politicians and interagency can somehow muddle through stringing that into a coherent strategy for defeating the other guy before the American public says "fuck it, this ain't worth it no more."

We historically also have a bad sense of Clausewitz's "cost of the object," whereby beyond a certain point, it's better to negotiate a possibly politically inconvenient settlement than keep pouring blood and treasure into a stalemate. Partially because Gulf War I spoiled us. And also because the American public has two problems:

1. They can't distinguish between war and sports, think both have to have an unambiguous "winner," and think politically inconvenient settlements are a "loss" like losing a football game, and that the lives and money spent to get there are automatically "wasted."
2. They think "war" and "peace" are two binary things as opposed to a rheostat, and a large portion thinks the pseudo-binary option called "war" is Always A Very Bad Immoral Thing that Good Educated Smart People Should Never Do. Because if you're in the military, you failed at life.

 

[Treetop Flyer]

It benefits the entire force (speaking of history, in WWII the Japanese Army and Navy were not that great at working together, and that was part of their undoing). It's a tradeoff between tactical excellence in the operating forces and growing your officer corps to understand the big picture.

"Joint" usually seems to mean "the Army way" anyway. JOPES, R2P2, Army planning, those are all verrrry similar. The Army has a lot of mnemonics and made up acronyms for company level stuff, but you're not drilling down that deep when you're doing joint stuff.

Something in favor of "jointness" is that militarily we've always been much better than most countries out there at operational level warfare. What that means in day to day terms is that your frontline forces don't run out of stuff in a war. What it means at the national level is that we can actually do power projection, like sail halfway around the world and be a force to be reckoned with (speaking of Japanese history, the deployment of the Russian Baltic fleet was a great example of how fail at this- I mean in the operational sense, not necessarily in exactly how the battle played out).

The undoing of the Japanese was their lack of diversity. It is our strength.

 

[nodropinufaka]

I wonder if there’s a better way with the JDAL billets to align URLs better with their career path?

Is there much value sticking a random LCDR or CDR in a position such as Office of Drug Policy, Legislative Affairs, or as an EA? That doesn’t help them tactically or with learning Joint Operations.

I understand not all JDAL billets are like that but there must be a better way.

 

[Spekkio]

The reason that JQOs are required is because before Goldwater-Nichols, the services didn't value joint time, were sending no-loads and broken toys to staff joint commands, and it was hindering the ability to operate as a Joint Force. Rice bowls, parochialism, etc. Congress via Goldwater-Nichols essentially forced the military to send due-course officers to do joint tours and play nice with each other. But this meant that you had to limit folks' time in JDAL billets so you could cycle through everyone who needed one. Ideal? Maybe, maybe not. But there's a reason it happened, grounded in the buffoonery and shenanigans of the past.

He asked a valid question and I think you missed the point.

On paper, the requirement is JPME1 prior to command, JPME2 / joint tour prior to major command.

In practice, we are pushing post-JOs and post-DHs to get JPME1 done, and using post DHs / post XOs in joint jobs where they change font sizes on power point slides when these mid-grade officers could be better employed honing warfare skills in a community-specific billet... because the detailers would rather send an officer to a joint billet early instead of being locked into sending the officer to a joint billet at the last possible minute, even though the officer is too junior to contribute any meaningful value beyond busywork.

The Navy still doesn't truly value joint jobs at the mid-grade levels...it's viewed as a requirement that has to be managed and get out of the way...the sooner, the better.

 

[nittany03]

Is there much value sticking a random LCDR or CDR in a position such as Office of Drug Policy, Legislative Affairs, or as an EA? That doesn’t help them tactically or with learning Joint Operations.

I understand not all JDAL billets are like that but there must be a better way.

In practice, we are pushing post-JOs and post-DHs to get JPME1 done, and using post DHs / post XOs in joint jobs where they change font sizes on power point slides when these mid-grade officers could be better employed honing warfare skills in a community-specific billet... because the detailers would rather send an officer to a joint billet early instead of being locked into sending the officer to a joint billet at the last possible minute, even though the officer is too junior to contribute any meaningful value beyond busywork.

The Navy still doesn't truly value joint jobs at the mid-grade levels...it's viewed as a requirement that has to be managed and get out of the way...the sooner, the better.

I won't dispute that warfare skills are important. But at some point, though, they can't be the be-all and end-all. And we as aviators tend, as a community, to be particularly parochial about this. Yes, it's true that as an O-4 at a COCOM, or even an O-5, you're the low man on the totem pole. But this is also generally someone's first look into the huge beast that is OLW and the interagency. And the more senior you get, the more you need to understand how that huge beast is put together so that you can put your future work in context.

It's just like how we tell junior aviators that they have to be a thinking crewmember in the cockpit. At some level, you need to be able to be a thinking crewmember on other levels, too. And part of that isn't just chopping PPT slides; it's being able to be in the room with the big shots and see how they think, what's important to them, and how they make decisions. At some point, that will become as important as the other stuff, especially for folks who stick around post-command.

 

[Brett327]

n practice, we are pushing post-JOs and post-DHs to get JPME1 done, and using post DHs / post XOs in joint jobs where they change font sizes on power point slides when these mid-grade officers could be better employed honing warfare skills in a community-specific billet... because the detailers would rather send an officer to a joint billet early instead of being locked into sending the officer to a joint billet at the last possible minute, even though the officer is too junior to contribute any meaningful value beyond busywork.

Absolutely not my experience in a joint job.

 

[nodropinufaka]

While that is good points about OLW and CCMD
I see a lot of dumb billets for O4s where people are doing font size ppts like @Spekkio said.

No doubt there’s good billets where O4s and O5s could gain valuable experience but some of the JDAL billets are just dumb and wasting an officers experience and often leaves them pretty upset and with a bad taste.

you’re not gonna learn much about OLW if they stick you in a random shop in the CCMD and make you a level 25 DTS administrator and responsible for booking the COS and Directors flights everywhere.

it seems like there could be a better way to look at the JDAL list and better align billets with the community you came from.

Example- SWO O4 goes to J-Fires at CCMD, Pilot goes Air Plans, EOD/SEAL to SOCOM JCETS. While that does happen- seems better if they found a way to manage those billets and keep it that way. Cause I’ve seen people show up to be air plans officers and get told “we got a civ for that- you can be the ppt ranger for the cos”.

 

[Mos]

I won't dispute that warfare skills are important. But at some point, though, they can't be the be-all and end-all. And we as aviators tend, as a community, to be particularly parochial about this. Yes, it's true that as an O-4 at a COCOM, or even an O-5, you're the low man on the totem pole. But this is also generally someone's first look into the huge beast that is OLW and the interagency. And the more senior you get, the more you need to understand how that huge beast is put together so that you can put your future work in context.

It's just like how we tell junior aviators that they have to be a thinking crewmember in the cockpit. At some level, you need to be able to be a thinking crewmember on other levels, too. And part of that isn't just chopping PPT slides; it's being able to be in the room with the big shots and see how they think, what's important to them, and how they make decisions. At some point, that will become as important as the other stuff, especially for folks who stick around post-command.

I must confess, I avoid joint (and really any staff) gig for one simple reason: I don't wanna grow up.

 

[Spekkio]

I won't dispute that warfare skills are important. But at some point, though, they can't be the be-all and end-all. And we as aviators tend, as a community, to be particularly parochial about this. Yes, it's true that as an O-4 at a COCOM, or even an O-5, you're the low man on the totem pole. But this is also generally someone's first look into the huge beast that is OLW and the interagency. And the more senior you get, the more you need to understand how that huge beast is put together so that you can put your future work in context.

Again, I'm not disputing the value of a joint job when it's done at the right time in an officer's career.

The right time, IMO, is generally post-CO. Before that time, the officer should become a master of tactically employing his platform.

Additionally, if the detailers waited to send people to joint jobs until post-CO, the pool of people on the 'I want to go on to major command and stay in forever' would be significantly smaller...thus, perhaps, reducing staff bloat. Just maybe.

 

[nittany03]

Again, I'm not disputing the value of a joint job when it's done at the right time in an officer's career.

The right time, IMO, is generally post-CO. Before that time, the officer should become a master of tactically employing his platform.

Additionally, if the detailers waited to send people to joint jobs until post-CO, the pool of people on the 'I want to go on to major command and stay in forever' would be significantly smaller...thus, perhaps, reducing staff bloat. Just maybe.

I'd argue it's pre-CO because command is where those other issues start to interface with tactical employment. I mean, I had to step off the active duty thing as a LT, but I can speak to the SELRES side where the CO is a key player in making sure his/her unit is set up correctly to support in a crisis. That involves being able to understand not only the AC command's mission, but knowing when/how to work with OSOs at higher levels and advocate for the correct manning/manpower and funds to be able to do impactful training and not just check a box for a good year. And possibly even having to get MOBs cut into the POM cycle so that at least some of your Sailors can do their real jobs when duty calls, and not get shipped off to hand out basketballs in Djibouti. Which means knowing how the POM cycle works.

Heck, on the SELRES side, for those aviators who weren't in a position to fly for CNATRA, TSW, or VR, OLW and COCOM billets are a viable path to command and O-6+, and in the event of stuff really kicking off in theater, a good part of the CAOC is going to benefit from having a bunch of crusty old O-4 to O-6 reservists showing up who know damn well how to run a NALE.

On the AC side, when I was a JO, the fact that our head shed had time in staff land directly effected their ability to take care of morale when we were on deployment, because when the extension rumors started flying around, they could credibly explain how the Joint Staff and COCOMs made inputs into the SDOB process and that nothing was official until we saw the SDOB pop on SIPR.