I’m not sure how I made a category error? I didn’t change my point of view.
Perhaps they don’t have maps at your “four year public research university” (one day you’ll get why that cracks me up) so let’s set aside sinkable aircraft carriers and concentrate on other systems and geography. China has approximately 2100 combat aircraft and the US (alone). But there’s more! Looking at a map it is easy to see that China’s “unsinkable aircraft carriers” (two artificial reefs, each capable of holding about 150 aircraft and related supported gear) are within striking distance of other unsinkable carriers like the Philippines (a mere 60 tactical aircraft but one big carrier), Japan (225 tactical aircraft), South Korea (400 tactical aircraft), Taiwan (275 tactical aircraft and very robust air defense systems) whose additional air power put the Chinese at a distinct advantage table. Of course we have Guam and those few carriers that you so easily dismiss.
At this point I haven’t even mentioned US air defense capabilities or the US advantage in tactical helicopters in that region. I haven’t noted Taiwan’s rather robust anti-ship missile network nor the potential involvement of India (600 tactical aircraft) or the American expeditionary capability reflected in the new USMC strategy or our overwhelming airborne anti-shipping capacity reflected in our patrol aircraft. Now, add to all of that the American/allied capability to refuel our aircraft in the air (vastly superior to China’s) and our substantial experience at working in an international joint manner and you’ll see China isn’t facing a cake walk. Yes, the Chinese army is massive, but it isn’t capable of making great strategic moves over much distance. Taiwan might be an easy target, but it would be a costly one.
Faced with geographic realities, it is clear that at this time, the Chinese military is not capable of demonstrating substantial regional (INDOPAC) reach or naval or air superiority due to three distinct factors: an inability to successfully integrate into the joint fight, minimal aerial refueling capabilities, and a lack of military-industrial infrastructure to support aviation production and procurement. Any one of these three areas would take a vast amount of time and resources to overcome, and all three together represent a monumental challenge to China. Certainly these shortcomings are not insurmountable but the odds of overcoming them by pumping sand in the Spratley’s are not favorable. And herein is China’s greatest weakness…joint warfare requires the ability to make decisions at the lowest level possible, and demands that commanders understand their specific roles and responsibilities and conduct of operations accordingly according to geographic and logistic realities. This fluidity takes more than practice, it takes experience and clearly would be challenged by the central committee, top-down political-military system currently employed by China. In the end the geography of the INDOPAC area favors those militaries that rely on centralized command of joint (and allied) forces capable of decentralized execution.