Berger's last quote in the story is a bit melodramatic. Perhaps another way to view this is that the MEUs just weren't needed in Turkey or Sudan.
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Road to 350: What Does the US Navy Do Anyway?
- Thread starter Randy Daytona
- Start date
On the other hand I can’t imagine why we needed to utilize our primary Tier 1 force (SEAL Team 6) and our only Africa focused direct action element (3rd SFG) for a pretty basic embassy evacuation. Either Berger is right (and that should worry people) or the JSOC people are just glory hunting for headlines and relevance (and that should worry people more).
SOF doesn't do NEO as a core MET. Especially Tier 1 SOF.
The MEU was absolutely needed, and wasn't available. So we pulled other assets from their current missions to do something that another unit should have been doing.
That isn't in dispute, but the MEUs clearly weren't required in the two operations he cited in order to achieve a successful outcome.
You're making my point for me here. Desired =/= required
I get it what you're saying. I suppose it leads into a higher question of why do we have a Marine Corps? Where was the SPMAGTF? Is this a mission that Tier 1 SOF has the time and resources to take on?
But really. What it boils down to is that we have a force that is supposed to do these things, who are ready and trained to do them, but the Navy couldn't produce the boats required to support them.
Are you advocating that we don't need a MEU for crisis response? That (Tier 1) SOF can pick up that slack? Honest question. We so have some SOF folks who are in places that we don't really need to be. They're just there to ensure we always have access if things get squirrelly. Do we retask them and take a MET away from the ARG/MEU?
I'm not trying to be a dick here. Just trying to gauge where you think the MEU fits in in all of this.
I'd love for some high side AWs btw.
HQMC has spent the better part of the last 5-6 years trying to get out of CENTCOM with rotational forces. SPMAGTF-CC went away and was replaced with an Army brigade. SPMAGTF was a stop gap for the lack of Amphibs. GFM allocations for ARG/MEUs have been pushing INDOPACOM hard during the same time period. All FD2030 efforts have focused significantly on the Pacific AOR. The Commandant desires heel-toe ARG/MEU deployments to support 2 separate COCOMs and that is likely a decades long problem to fix. It is directly tied to ship funding, but we can’t be upset when all of our strategic messaging has been very focused on another area. That being said, The Navy and Marines (…and the entire DOD) looked really fucking stupid when Libya went down years ago - So the Commandant has a right to comment had the situation gone further south.
Did EUCOM have a lack of resources that required the diversion of a MEU/ARG during the Turkey earthquakes? A developed country like Turkey likely doesn’t need same level of capability that a MEU or MEB provides (Haiti, Philippines, etc).
Lots of questions over Sudan…. was the threat environment permissive enough for a MEU evacuation? People often forget that very high risk evacuations often involve purely SOF elements with Marines for alert contingencies for in extremis situations that are deemed too risky for a conventional NEO. You just typically don’t hear about them like we have with Sudan. Not sure on many details but given the amount of hostilities it is likely that decision was made very early on during the crisis.
What it REALLY boils down to is that we have a force that is flexible enough to get the job done even when the optimal resources aren't available. That quality will be even more important in high end conflict than in a simple NEO.
I think we're saying the same thing.
Edit: as @Hotdogs interjected..
The Commandant has a right to say, hey guys if you want us here and want us to be able to do this you have to fund it.
Or take the capability away.
But those SOF units that were retasked to Sudan, along with all of the other units that support them (that a MEU would bring or request) weren't just sitting on their thumbs drinking Rip Its and spending 8 hours a day in the gym.
If we're going to advertise having a 911 force in readiness (the USMC) then we need to follow through and fund it.
Those units did a great job of flexing, but there were costs involved.
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What were they doing?
This isn't a SCIF.
That’s a silly response. We’re they pulled off another op or we’re they in garrison?
Here’s the problem. While they weren’t pulled off an op (and likely 3rd SFG elements already in Africa established the FARP) it took a lot of time to get them there. The official story is that negotiations were under way to ensure a safe passage but the fact it is takes time to get 100 SEALS and three MH-47’s in place. If we had the tools we are supposed to have, an ARG, the people and equipment to pull off the op would have already been in place (or nearby at the very least).
But there is another flaw in this debate. This is not a job for SOF. Using them is the equivalent of saying, “Hey, the Nimitz is in the area, grab 75 swabbies and 25 officers from the air wing and send them in on the HSC birds to evacuate the embassy…it’s not like they are fighting a war or anything.” The ready squadron of the DEVGRU (or Delta) is there for emergencies that require quick planning and specialized training. When I was a Marine we did a lot of NEO rehearsals and while it isn’t easy, it wasn’t exactly Ph.D. level operations either. What if we suddenly got the chance to capture or kill America’s #1 enemy only to find our alert SOF element busy doing a job any 100 well trained Marines could do…if they had the platform?
