The end of NATO?

[Spekkio]

Again, do you think platform signals have changed in the last 25 years?

Do you think the asset used for target positive ID was used in 2000?

Do you think the same BDA tools were used in 2000?

Is it your contention that there exists an adversary that....

• Lacks the technology for persistant ISR capabilities to have previously observed military operations in Yemen
• Lacks the intel community framework to analyze and predict US cyclic operations in Yemen that have been occuring for well over a year to ever previously deployed non-persistent assets on station to observe U.S. operations
• Despite these shortfalls, is capable enough to deploy a dedicated non-persistent ISR platform with under 2 hours notice and...
• This non-persistant ISR platform is sophisticated and capable enough to collect first-of-its-kind intel on the U.S. F2T2EA killchain and TTPs that will expose a previously unknown critical vulnerability akin to discovering the plans to the Death Star?

 

[Randy Daytona]

VPOTUS also getting “down with the troops” - range time

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1904972827444257252

Back in the day: In between being Assistant Secretary of the Navy (1897-1898) and President (1901-1909), Teddy Roosevelt was “Down with the troops” in 1898.


Colonel Roosevelt and the Rough Riders along with members of the 3rd Volunteers and the 10th Cavalry Regiment after capturing Kettle Hill in Cuba during the Spanish-American War in July 1898

 

[Max Q]

Is it your contention that there exists an adversary that....

I am saying the Houthis probably lack the wherewithal for 2 hours to benefit them, but China:

• Possesses the technology for persistant ISR capabilities to have previously observed military operations in Yemen
• Possesses the intel community framework to analyze and predict US cyclic operations in Yemen that have been occuring for well over a year to ever previously deployed non-persistent assets on station to observe U.S. operations
• Is capable enough to deploy a dedicated non-persistent ISR platform with under 2 hours notice.
• This non-persistant ISR platform could be sophisticated and capable enough to collect first-of-its-kind intel on the U.S. F2T2EA killchain and TTPs that will expose a previously unknown critical vulnerability akin to discovering the plans to the Death Star

Just because they’ve seen it before doesn’t mean they can’t find something new. Is your argument that since they’ve monitored our actions we shouldn’t change or protect anything?
This circles back to why the fuck were D/CIA, D/ODNI, NSC, SecDef, VP talking about this on signal.

 

[Faded Float Coat]

But it's not as if we divulged B-2 bomber communication vulnerabilities, or RCS parameters for an F-18 being engaged by a SM-6.

Administrations fuck up, all the time, hopefully they learn some lessons along the way. And please, spare me the moral outrage police comments on all things "Trump is Bad" without at least considering missteps of previous administrations. Fair?

Dude.... near as a I can tell, almost everyone here who's been critical (rightfully so) of this shit-show has said, "AND it was bad when others did it." You're creating this friction for yourself, perhaps it helps with the cope? And to the bolded blurb above, if that's your threshold, man, things are worse than I could've imagined.

 

[number9]

https://www.reddit.com/r/navy/s/LyQB38juvX

Pretty good (IMHO) write up from a verified SWO O-6.

I read pretty much all of his Reddit posts - much to learn from a very capable leader.

 

[number9]

Is it your contention that there exists an adversary that....

• Lacks the technology for persistant ISR capabilities to have previously observed military operations in Yemen
• Lacks the intel community framework to analyze and predict US cyclic operations in Yemen that have been occuring for well over a year to ever previously deployed non-persistent assets on station to observe U.S. operations
• Despite these shortfalls, is capable enough to deploy a dedicated non-persistent ISR platform with under 2 hours notice and...
• This non-persistant ISR platform is sophisticated and capable enough to collect first-of-its-kind intel on the U.S. F2T2EA killchain and TTPs that will expose a previously unknown critical vulnerability akin to discovering the plans to the Death Star?

Is it your contention that if the answer to all these is "No", then the Signal information could rightfully be unclass?

 

[robav8r]

Dude.... near as a I can tell, almost everyone here who's been critical (rightfully so) of this shit-show has said, "AND it was bad when others did it." You're creating this friction for yourself, perhaps it helps with the cope? And to the bolded blurb above, if that's your threshold, man, things are worse than I could've imagined.

OK Dude, OK.

Context and content is important here. Not making excuses, for anyone, just trying to keep the MOP grounded a bit . . .

 

[Spekkio]

Is it your contention that if the answer to all these is "No", then the Signal information could rightfully be unclass?

My contention was that if we're being strict about definitions of classification levels, it should be confidential due to elevating risk to force and risk to mission, but the impact of that risk would not be felt above the tactical level.

This presumes the mission actually supported some broader strategic or national security objective, but apparently it did not.

Now, the fact that we have people in government shrugging at the decision to give a kill order and then reasoning "why not, it'll help with messaging against the Democrats" makes me sick to my stomach. I thought that kind of stuff died with the end of the Cold War.

If I were President, I'd fire all of them for that. Their priorities are in the wrong place. Except Waltz, he was the only one making arguments based on global economic national interests.

As for China, I agree they're a capable intel adversary. I also think that there's nothing they gleaned from this strike militarily that they didn't already know. But now they have inside knowledge of what factors our highest officials in government are considering when giving their advise to the President.

 

[number9]

My contention was that if we're being strict about definitions of classification levels, it should be confidential due to elevating risk to force and risk to mission, but the impact of that risk would not be felt above the tactical level.

This presumes the mission actually supported some broader strategic or national security objective, but apparently it did not.

Thanks for the thoughtful reply If we're being strict about classification levels, I argue we should look at the CENTCOM classification guide (unclass version here) which says operational plans are secret. As are timelines...

Now, the fact that we have people in government shrugging at the decision to give a kill order and then reasoning "why not, it'll help with messaging against the Democrats" makes me sick to my stomach. I thought that kind of stuff died with the end of the Cold War.

Agreed.

 

[Spekkio]

I argue we should look at the CENTCOM classification guide (unclass version here) which says operational plans are secret. As are timelines...

Where it gets muddy is this is SECDEF, who doesn't have to adhere to how CENTCOM defines normal / serious / grave damage in a way that balances risk with ease of communication for his subordinates.

It doesn't belong on signal either way, but this isn't like something under a SAP was leaked. It's more akin to the LTJG who wink mentioned left with some classified notes and dropped them.

 

[number9]

Where it gets muddy is this is SECDEF, who doesn't have to adhere to how CENTCOM defines normal / serious / grave damage in a way that balances risk with ease of communication for his subordinates.

It doesn't belong on signal either way, but this isn't like something under a SAP was leaked.

I thought about that too. Does that mean his defense (pardon the pun) would have to be, "it was unclassified because I declassified it"?

 

[Spekkio]

No idea how that works. Can the Secretary of Defense or President unilaterally decide to read a high-level OPLAN to the public at a press conference?

I don't think that Hegseth was being that deliberate in his thought process here.

 

[whitesoxnation]

Who cares what the classification is/was, what an OCA can/can’t do. It’s a question of judgement.

 

[number9]

No idea how that works. Can the Secretary of Defense or President unilaterally decide to read a high-level OPLAN to the public at a press conference?

I don't think that Hegseth was being that deliberate in his thought process here.

I think POTUS can do pretty much whatever he wants, with the exception of atomic secrets. SECDEF, I don't know. If he's the OCA I... guess he probably can do quite a lot?

Who cares what the classification is/was, what an OCA can/can’t do. It’s a question of judgement.

There is no argument from me that the most staggeringly bad judgement was used here.

 

[CommodoreMid]

Thanks for the thoughtful reply If we're being strict about classification levels, I argue we should look at the CENTCOM classification guide (unclass version here) which says operational plans are secret. As are timelines...

Agreed.

Can probably go take a gander on the HST CAS at the airplan and my guess is that’s the correct answer.