Sapper!
Excuse the BS...
happened again 11 days later except it was an LT flying an F-18.
http://magazine.byu.edu/?act=view&a=1273
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Things that make you go Hmmmmmmm............
- Thread starter jmcquate
- Start date
happened again 11 days later except it was an LT flying an F-18.
http://magazine.byu.edu/?act=view&a=1273
It's "still do." Auto mode is still Patriot's primary mode of operation in many cases. I know that people want to freak out about not having a man in the loop, but as this thread has demonstrated, both man and machine are capable of making bad decisions. The machine operates under a set of rules, just like the man and both are capable of making mistakes when operating under potentially ambiguous circumstances. If it's any consollation, that same Patriot battery (rumor has it) took a HARM from a CJ who thought he was shooting at an SA-6.
Brett
Sapper!
Excuse the BS...
Was googling around and found the same bit of info about the patriot being shot at. I think that was around the same time frame as the tornado shoot down. I'll try to find the link for relevance.
Harrier Dude
Living the dream
I remember that, and at the time most of us not directly involved in that incident thought it was "he shot at me, I'm shooting back at him" type incident. I'm not suggesting that it was deliberate retaliation, just that I'd HEARD he saw indications and acted accordingly.
I was much more worried about getting smoked by a Patriot than by Iraqi SA fire.
I was much more worried about getting smoked by a Patriot than by Iraqi SA fire.
I'm sorry, but I don't think you can say that a zero-defect mentality is bad so you have to excuse some offenses, but then try to include a pilot shooting down a friendly aircraft in that discussion.
There are lots of issues that I think most on this forum will agree are treated as egregious because of the perception of a zero defect mentality. (We obviously can not have a zero defect mentality since I saw a message from the CNO once saying we don't have one. Therefore we must have the "perception" of a zero-defect mentality; right?)
Suppose the CO of a ship is asleep in the middle of the night and the OOD does something silly like backing down the ship into the Plane Guard cruiser. Should the CO get relieved in this case? In a zero-defect mentality, he would.
Regardless of a zero-defect mentality, some offenses are unrecoverable from in the Navy. If you get a DUI and no one is hurt, is that a career-ender? In today's Navy, yes. Would you argue that the offender should get a pass because of extenuating circumstances? Is a DUI a lesser or greater offense than a blue-on-blue?
I'm sorry, I can not accept that we should include shooting down a friendly in a zero-defect mentality discussion.
None of the press reports I have seen have discussed his asking for clarification from either his RIO, wingman or ship. If someone was telling him it was no exercise and to shoot and THEY were wrong, then I consider his actions as excusable. But to try to work a zero-defect mentality argument and using this incident is just too far of a stretch for me.
Swiss cheese model doesn't really apply that well to this situation, because it wasn't an accident. It was a willful release of ordnance. Or maybe it does...but instead of a bunch of slices with small holes lining up, it's just one slice of cheese with a giant hole in the middle...
And including this into an argument about zero-defect mentality is absolutely preposterous. Huge difference between on-the-job incompetence and off-duty shenanigans, or even on-the-job ignorance that is later corrected through good leadership or positive self-improvement.
And including this into an argument about zero-defect mentality is absolutely preposterous. Huge difference between on-the-job incompetence and off-duty shenanigans, or even on-the-job ignorance that is later corrected through good leadership or positive self-improvement.
This is why we call things "mishaps" not "accidents." And there are a lot of holes - carrying live air-to-air ordnance for an exercise (!), RIO didn't see that the missile was armed, etc. etc. etc. This is not some rogue dude who decided to smoke an F-4 on a whim - and even if it was, there are still holes in the swiss cheese.
A zero defect mentality is bad simply because you encourage a culture that cannot learn or move on from the #1 source of learning -- mistakes. This story has absolutely everything to do with the zero defect mentality. Being on- or off-duty doesn't matter, mistakes are mistakes. Learning from our mistakes is what separates us from our mindless adversaries and makes us such a powerful airborne force. Step into a middle-eastern air force debrief, and there’s not a whole lot of learning going on there because highlighting error is a cultural roadblock for them. Step into an AF light gray debrief and you'd think the flight lead hates his mother for having him for all the mistakes he kicks himself over as a cultural norm.
I know of an otherwise competent, professional aviator who bounced back from releasing ordnance from his jet (in a bad way) to become a successful astronaut, an asset on our side. All because people in the loop along the way were able to forgive and allow the good in him to come out rather than be spring loaded to crap on him. I'd rather have the guy in the command that has learned his lesson. I'd rather send a guy into space who has dealt with mistakes. That's the guy who can honestly reinforce learning in others (where learning from others' mistakes is the preferred way to go).
The second benefit to a culture that doesn't automatically shit on you for screwing up is that we get people who not only can move on from mistakes, but can have more confidence in what they are doing. Trust is empowering. I'm not going to the precious snowflake extreme here, but a leadership culture that balances inspiring confidence based on trust with the will to take profitable risks is the one that wins. Trust is one thing that has been a slow leak since the beginning of aviation and aviators need some modicum of trust whether it's from up high or amongst each other in order to do this job. Risk aversion is like fuel on the fire with a zero-defect culture and thinking that we're going to grow from mistakes once we achieve our riskless utopia is what is actually preposterous. All that said, I’m afraid that achieving zero mishaps and reducing risk to zero is probably the moment we become ineffective in combat if you wrap your head around that one.
The third benefit to a more accepting culture is that bad expectations beget bad results. Expectations tend to be fulfilled, and if you expect LT X to make another mistake after he just screwed the pooch the first time, he'll probably screw it again. There's a time to lay off and let people fix their shit. And this story? Damn, this Dorsey dude is still on trial for a mistake he made in 1987. That's an antique car in most states.
I know of an otherwise competent, professional aviator who bounced back from releasing ordnance from his jet (in a bad way) to become a successful astronaut, an asset on our side. All because people in the loop along the way were able to forgive and allow the good in him to come out rather than be spring loaded to crap on him. I'd rather have the guy in the command that has learned his lesson. I'd rather send a guy into space who has dealt with mistakes. That's the guy who can honestly reinforce learning in others (where learning from others' mistakes is the preferred way to go).
The second benefit to a culture that doesn't automatically shit on you for screwing up is that we get people who not only can move on from mistakes, but can have more confidence in what they are doing. Trust is empowering. I'm not going to the precious snowflake extreme here, but a leadership culture that balances inspiring confidence based on trust with the will to take profitable risks is the one that wins. Trust is one thing that has been a slow leak since the beginning of aviation and aviators need some modicum of trust whether it's from up high or amongst each other in order to do this job. Risk aversion is like fuel on the fire with a zero-defect culture and thinking that we're going to grow from mistakes once we achieve our riskless utopia is what is actually preposterous. All that said, I’m afraid that achieving zero mishaps and reducing risk to zero is probably the moment we become ineffective in combat if you wrap your head around that one.
The third benefit to a more accepting culture is that bad expectations beget bad results. Expectations tend to be fulfilled, and if you expect LT X to make another mistake after he just screwed the pooch the first time, he'll probably screw it again. There's a time to lay off and let people fix their shit. And this story? Damn, this Dorsey dude is still on trial for a mistake he made in 1987. That's an antique car in most states.
There is truth to letting people get past mistakes (learn from, teach others from them) - there was once an FRS LSO who wrecked a jet to the tune of Class A damage - AMB determined primary cause was material failure of a key component, however along the way they highlighted things the pilot could have and should have done differently and better. After a sweet ass VTC with the Air Boss the LT was allowed to continue flying, has done quite nicely and is progressing right along now. For sure mistakes were made, the pilot is better for the experience and put a lot into his experience bucket because of the event/process.
NOW - this guy pulled the trigger and shot down an American aircraft.
Call me a hypocrite, but there's a big difference. Air Pirate - you make some good points about culture, development, and mentorship - BUT this guy pulled the trigger and shot down an American aircraft - and it doesn't READ (could be mistaken) that it was a sort problem or a mis-id.
NOW - this guy pulled the trigger and shot down an American aircraft.
Call me a hypocrite, but there's a big difference. Air Pirate - you make some good points about culture, development, and mentorship - BUT this guy pulled the trigger and shot down an American aircraft - and it doesn't READ (could be mistaken) that it was a sort problem or a mis-id.
So, going with your argument, is any accident or incident unrecoverable from?
I'm not denying any egregiousness. I’m just saying there will be some pills to swallow. 'Sounds like you guys are both asking where to draw the line. I suppose we can't just say, ok, new culture in effect on Oct 1...deal. The problem is that we don't have any credibility now to draw the line somewhere because we've spent it all on lesser things. From what I saw, more investigations were framed in the context of protecting lives, reducing risk, etc. etc, that were simply covers for agendas and I can still see it going on as a contractor. Thus, we ended up kicking someone out or pulling someone's wings in essence because they are ugly, the XO doesn't like them, they screwed someone's girlfriend, etc., etc. We'd like to think things are different, but human nature is a wily bandit.
I'd say some ways to begin a shift in thinking are to,
1. Embrace the big picture and talk about it. Did a person directly endanger others or are we just preventing the possibility for harm distantly. Accept a little risk already. We have transformed the "should have seen it coming" risk management from a trend of flathatting B-52s to a trend of not memorizing some bit of data properly as if the bad-memorizing guy is the same threat to safety as the flathatting B-52 guy. Granted, the most unlikely part of such a change is shifting public perception of how much risk and money war takes, but gifted leaders might be able to sell a good case *fingers crossed*.
2. Change investigation policy and get to the root of inquisitions. With the big picture in mind, why is this person on trial? Really. We like to think that our processes such as FNAEBs are neutral, but they just aren't. There are plenty of foxes guarding their own henhouses, and, oh btw, the safety process suffers. Non-neutral people means skewed results and hidden agendas. We already have defined communities that funnel who is involved and the agendas they bring with them, so that doesn't help. Finding a way to make things impartial is half the battle. To top that off, favoritism grows quick roots in our culture. Cool kids get away with more while uncool kids get the book thrown at them. This is human nature but it also helps eliminate the ability to draw a credible line.
3. Draw the line high as high as you can stand it and work your way down (mindful of the first two points). Actual loss of life, multiple lives, felony crime, hell I don't know, discuss. Whatever the line is, we have no credibility to set it anywhere in the middle. Little to no right to say what is right and wrong after yay-many inconsistencies like this have floated through. We can't just fly the ball all over the lens for years and then say we're fed up and will nail it the next time. We need to do something different and it's probably a better idea to chip away from the high side rather than keep fighting the fly-throughs. We can probably be safe with what is already illegal as a starting point if that sounds obvious enough.
4. Positive culture instead of negative culture. Encourage and trust each other. If I had to use a broad brush, that is a big difference I have noted between AF and Navy [aviation] culture...that there is more negativity in Navy culture. There's a lot to be said for the "sink or swim" tone that the AF doesn’t seem to understand, but maybe a few inches to the left would help us out while continuing to produce good fighters. Look for success instead of failure. Point out success in others, and banish the overgrown tattletales that bring others' mistakes to the skipper just so they can get more face time. We cannot be defined by the mistakes of others -- that those of us who haven't made mistakes are somehow a cut above. We cannot be defined by our attrition rates so as to proclaim how rare and successful we are because X people failed to be as awesome. We can't keep giving each other negative callsigns even if it's fun and expect our ready rooms to come together like they should. For you guys on AD, the camaraderie that you have right now is something you will never have beyond the Navy and will probably miss the most when you leave. You probably have even less camaraderie than I had, and I probably had even less than my father did. Ok, now I sound like a sappy-ass dad, but if you guys know that your ready rooms are safe and everyone can enjoy the good things about each other, accept each other, and help each other then, wow, you might actually be 70 years old and still talking to each other. Otherwise, you will keep playing the game of who to trust. Sure, a bit idealistic, but it's better to say you had a great time flying with those guys rather than say you had fulfilling career of mishap-free flying and 100% valid shots like your children will probably say.
I'd say some ways to begin a shift in thinking are to,
1. Embrace the big picture and talk about it. Did a person directly endanger others or are we just preventing the possibility for harm distantly. Accept a little risk already. We have transformed the "should have seen it coming" risk management from a trend of flathatting B-52s to a trend of not memorizing some bit of data properly as if the bad-memorizing guy is the same threat to safety as the flathatting B-52 guy. Granted, the most unlikely part of such a change is shifting public perception of how much risk and money war takes, but gifted leaders might be able to sell a good case *fingers crossed*.
2. Change investigation policy and get to the root of inquisitions. With the big picture in mind, why is this person on trial? Really. We like to think that our processes such as FNAEBs are neutral, but they just aren't. There are plenty of foxes guarding their own henhouses, and, oh btw, the safety process suffers. Non-neutral people means skewed results and hidden agendas. We already have defined communities that funnel who is involved and the agendas they bring with them, so that doesn't help. Finding a way to make things impartial is half the battle. To top that off, favoritism grows quick roots in our culture. Cool kids get away with more while uncool kids get the book thrown at them. This is human nature but it also helps eliminate the ability to draw a credible line.
3. Draw the line high as high as you can stand it and work your way down (mindful of the first two points). Actual loss of life, multiple lives, felony crime, hell I don't know, discuss. Whatever the line is, we have no credibility to set it anywhere in the middle. Little to no right to say what is right and wrong after yay-many inconsistencies like this have floated through. We can't just fly the ball all over the lens for years and then say we're fed up and will nail it the next time. We need to do something different and it's probably a better idea to chip away from the high side rather than keep fighting the fly-throughs. We can probably be safe with what is already illegal as a starting point if that sounds obvious enough.
4. Positive culture instead of negative culture. Encourage and trust each other. If I had to use a broad brush, that is a big difference I have noted between AF and Navy [aviation] culture...that there is more negativity in Navy culture. There's a lot to be said for the "sink or swim" tone that the AF doesn’t seem to understand, but maybe a few inches to the left would help us out while continuing to produce good fighters. Look for success instead of failure. Point out success in others, and banish the overgrown tattletales that bring others' mistakes to the skipper just so they can get more face time. We cannot be defined by the mistakes of others -- that those of us who haven't made mistakes are somehow a cut above. We cannot be defined by our attrition rates so as to proclaim how rare and successful we are because X people failed to be as awesome. We can't keep giving each other negative callsigns even if it's fun and expect our ready rooms to come together like they should. For you guys on AD, the camaraderie that you have right now is something you will never have beyond the Navy and will probably miss the most when you leave. You probably have even less camaraderie than I had, and I probably had even less than my father did. Ok, now I sound like a sappy-ass dad, but if you guys know that your ready rooms are safe and everyone can enjoy the good things about each other, accept each other, and help each other then, wow, you might actually be 70 years old and still talking to each other. Otherwise, you will keep playing the game of who to trust. Sure, a bit idealistic, but it's better to say you had a great time flying with those guys rather than say you had fulfilling career of mishap-free flying and 100% valid shots like your children will probably say.
I wouldn’t expect a more balanced mentality to simply excuse offenses. I just find it just as unrealistic to continue beating a mistake that happened 25 years ago. Manage might be a better word since we like to manage all sorts of things now'adays. Manage risk, manage growth, manage change, lol.
In theory, I'd like to think that there is nothing from which we can't recover, but I realize that's not probable. Along with the above, there is certainly a line somewhere because we will either run out of resources to deal with anything above the line or reach the limit of our moral flexibility. The culture problems here are simply consistency and credibility. If you AD guys are the fathers of a burgeoning culture shift, consistency and credibility are the same principles you've hopefully been applying to your kids at home.
all very insightful and extremely well thought out (maybe not the part about callsigns...?) - but I submit that pulling the trigger and firing a missile without having any real idea what you're doing falls WELL OUTSIDE the margins you describe.
A few years ago we had a charlie nugget taxi his jet into his lead at the NFL holdshort (nx). Instead of saying "hey, dumbass, don't taxi into your lead - why are you trying to get so damned close anyway?" "we" instead asked why the FRS didn't teach visual checkpoints for parking...
The margin here is that even for crimes we have a statute of limitations. I don’t think it’s worth the inconsistency to not promote a guy today for something that was investigated and closed 25 years ago. Callsigns are probably for another discussion.
Hmm. Why didn’t you guys say both things? To the nugget and the FRS? Again, I’m not discounting personal accountability in all things. My dad knew a guy who was FNAEB’d for flying an F-8 in a t-shirt, shorts, and sandals. ‘Takes all kinds.
Hmm. Why didn’t you guys say both things? To the nugget and the FRS? Again, I’m not discounting personal accountability in all things. My dad knew a guy who was FNAEB’d for flying an F-8 in a t-shirt, shorts, and sandals. ‘Takes all kinds.
If we can fire a guy for videos he made 5-6 years ago, because they offended someone, then we sure as hell can not promote a guy to Admiral because he tried to kill an American crew 25 years ago. I agree that there is a line, but almost killing someone, intentionally, is crossing it.