USS Fitzgerald collision in C7F

[azguy]

Maybe I missed some better pics/video, but our own pic above does not show (what I am assuming was) an overtaking situation. The video link doesn’t have 5 short. All of this gives the Russians an in to twist the truth.

I think the photo shows an overtaking situation pretty well in terms of angle/geometry; also, as someone else noted, the Udaloy's wake is huge indicating it was traveling faster and truly overtaking. For Joe Public that doesn't know what an overtaking situation is, that picture still does a pretty good job illustrating that the Russians were intentionally getting too close to the US.

Five short would have been prudent. Could have waived off the helo and maneuvered sooner to avoid having to go back full. But hindsight is 20/20. For this to happen with a Russian ship (vs Chinese) in the Phil Sea (vs Black Sea, Med, Baltic) was totally unexpected.

 

[Gatordev]

This seems like more brilliant media manipulation buy the Russians.

"Vut? No, our sailors jus sunning themselves while ship was steaming innocently. Then Amerikanski ship veer into Russian ship. We are innocent."

 

[nittany03]

ProPublica: "Blame Over Justice: The Human Toll of the Navy’s Relentless Push to Punish One of Its Own"

 

[Jim123]

I'm honestly disappointed that the manslaughter thing didn't make it to a public trial. Everything that Big Navy, 7th Fleet, the Desron, SWO school, and everybody else had ignored for years to save a buck and say "can do" with "more with less" when we could not, all of the ways that the chain of command set up those crews for failure, all that would have been in the spotlight. That kind of embarrassing public exposure would have been the best thing to happen in the aftermath of these mishaps.

 

[ChuckMK23]

I'm honestly disappointed that the manslaughter thing didn't make it to a public trial. Everything that Big Navy, 7th Fleet, the Desron, SWO school, and everybody else had ignored for years to save a buck and say "can do" with "more with less" when we could not, all of the ways that the chain of command set up those crews for failure, all that would have been in the spotlight. That kind of embarrassing public exposure would have been the best thing to happen in the aftermath of these mishaps.

Ahhhh, all better now.

 

[robav8r]

Ahhhh, all better now.

“The service told the GAO that it could take 16 years or more to see if the changes that the Navy implemented to its training would see any positive effect.”

CO’s need a LOT more discretionary time at sea to build wardroom ship handling skills. Too bad our budgetary constraints will continue to hamper that . . . .

 

[SynixMan]

“The service told the GAO that it could take 16 years or more to see if the changes that the Navy implemented to its training would see any positive effect.”

CO’s need a LOT more discretionary time at sea to build wardroom ship handling skills. Too bad our budgetary constraints will continue to hamper that . . . .

I work with SWOs daily and their institutional rot is staggering. Their system just fucking breaks people, time and time again.

 

[Spekkio]

CO’s need a LOT more discretionary time at sea to build wardroom ship handling skills. Too bad our budgetary constraints will continue to hamper that . . . .

No, they just need standards.

Encountered a recent chop who has time spent standing conning officer. Aside from the fact that the comprehensive review stated that SWOs were not to do this anymore, the chop had 0 knowledge of the nautical rules of the road. Like, got a 25% on his written multiple choice test and couldn't articulate what to do in a simple interaction in an oral interview. And he was standing watch responsible for the safety of a warship not too long ago.

We don't let people get a learner's permit without passing a written exam on the rules of the road. Why the SWO community doesn't hold the same standard is beyond me.

The community doesn't need 16 years to let everyone become a CO before they can assess the effectiveness of corrective actions.

 

[Griz882]

What happened to the old SWO books? Those things took you through everything and the exams were tough. As I recall you had to have JOOD underway and EOW complete before you could even do day-time OOD underway.

 

[robav8r]

No, they just need standards.

Encountered a recent chop who has time spent standing conning officer. Aside from the fact that the comprehensive review stated that SWOs were not to do this anymore, the chop had 0 knowledge of the nautical rules of the road. Like, got a 25% on his written multiple choice test and couldn't articulate what to do in a simple interaction in an oral interview. And he was standing watch responsible for the safety of a warship not too long ago.

We don't let people get a learner's permit without passing a written exam on the rules of the road. Why the SWO community doesn't hold the same standard is beyond me.

The community doesn't need 16 years to let everyone become a CO before they can assess the effectiveness of corrective actions.

No. CO’s need more discretionary time at sea to build wardroom ship handling skills. What they are currently doing is trying to stuff 10 lbs of shit into a 2 lb sack. The Navy, and other services, have stripped away the time, and resources, that unit level CO’s absolutely need to hone their warfighting organizations. Let them do what we selected them to do. If they fail, hold them accountable. But let’s at least give them the tools to do their job.

 

[AllAmerican75]

What happened to the old SWO books? Those things took you through everything and the exams were tough. As I recall you had to have JOOD underway and EOW complete before you could even do day-time OOD underway.

Those are still a thing but they get pencil-whipped pretty hard. The problem is that you have LTJGs with very little sea time teaching Ensigns with zero sea time and the Skipper or XO are not always around (due to administrative duties) to oversee it. Meanwhile, Dept Heads are too busy stabbign each other in the back to get that number 1 EP and continue their careers. Also, if you hold up the completion of the OOD, 3M, DC, CICWO, ATWO, OOD In Port, JOOD, SWO Engineering, OOD Underway, and finally SWO PQS completion (not to mention the attendant PQS requirements that feed into these PQSs) then you quickly run out of qualified OODs and end up relying on port and starboard OODs or just a single A team for complicated evolutions like UNREPs and Sea and Anchor detail. Did I mention that all of these JOs have absurdly large administrative requirements as well due to the need to run their divisions and deal with the kneejerk reactions of their chains of command?

“The service told the GAO that it could take 16 years or more to see if the changes that the Navy implemented to its training would see any positive effect.”
CO’s need a LOT more discretionary time at sea to build wardroom ship handling skills. Too bad our budgetary constraints will continue to hamper that . . . .

It's not budgets so much as the culture. We could easily change our training methods to be in line with something similar to the Coast Guard or Merchant Marine and actually tie Conn, OOD, and EOOW to actual tonnage licenses, but the support isn't there. That would require a shift in mentality of how we train JOs and probably necessitate the elimination of certain administrative burdens that have been placed upon the shoulders of Ensigns and LTJGs.

I'm honestly disappointed that the manslaughter thing didn't make it to a public trial. Everything that Big Navy, 7th Fleet, the Desron, SWO school, and everybody else had ignored for years to save a buck and say "can do" with "more with less" when we could not, all of the ways that the chain of command set up those crews for failure, all that would have been in the spotlight. That kind of embarrassing public exposure would have been the best thing to happen in the aftermath of these mishaps.

This is the key problem in the Surface Navy. The mindset has been that of perfection and a refusal to tell Congress "No!" for so long that it's rotted the culture of the community. COs and officers can't make mistakes and can't ever be honest about their actual ability to get underway or meet some tasking. Crews and wardrooms are run ragged and then expected to recover on shore duty. We play shell games with parts and personnel to ensure that ships can get a top score on INSURV and pre-deployment certifications and then gut them immediately afterwards to get the next ship to pass. And really, no ship will actually fail to meet training standards because that would put too much stress on the Fleet due to missed deployments. We simply cannot continue to operate in the manner that we do but Lord forbid anyone ever be honest.

 

[Griz882]

Those are still a thing but they get pencil-whipped pretty hard. The problem is that you have LTJGs with very little sea time teaching Ensigns with zero sea time and the Skipper or XO are not always around (due to administrative duties) to oversee it. Meanwhile, Dept Heads are too busy stabbign each other in the back to get that number 1 EP and continue their careers. Also, if you hold up the completion of the OOD, 3M, DC, CICWO, ATWO, OOD In Port, JOOD, SWO Engineering, OOD Underway, and finally SWO PQS completion (not to mention the attendant PQS requirements that feed into these PQSs) then you quickly run out of qualified OODs and end up relying on port and starboard OODs or just a single A team for complicated evolutions like UNREPs and Sea and Anchor detail. Did I mention that all of these JOs have absurdly large administrative requirements as well due to the need to run their divisions and deal with the kneejerk reactions of their chains of command?



It's not budgets so much as the culture. We could easily change our training methods to be in line with something similar to the Coast Guard or Merchant Marine and actually tie Conn, OOD, and EOOW to actual tonnage licenses, but the support isn't there. That would require a shift in mentality of how we train JOs and probably necessitate the elimination of certain administrative burdens that have been placed upon the shoulders of Ensigns and LTJGs.



This is the key problem in the Surface Navy. The mindset has been that of perfection and a refusal to tell Congress "No!" for so long that it's rotted the culture of the community. COs and officers can't make mistakes and can't ever be honest about their actual ability to get underway or meet some tasking. Crews and wardrooms are run ragged and then expected to recover on shore duty. We play shell games with parts and personnel to ensure that ships can get a top score on INSURV and pre-deployment certifications and then gut them immediately afterwards to get the next ship to pass. And really, no ship will actually fail to meet training standards because that would put too much stress on the Fleet due to missed deployments. We simply cannot continue to operate in the manner that we do but Lord forbid anyone ever be honest.

Jesus. What a mess.

 

[AllAmerican75]

Jesus. What a mess.

Exactly. It's why I redesignated and why many have gotten out entirely. It also why they have to offer $105k to convince people to stay in.

 

[Spekkio]

No. CO’s need more discretionary time at sea to build wardroom ship handling skills.

'I need more CODT' is the battle cry of every CO of an underperforming crew. Almost always there are underlying issues with the effectiveness of training that doesn't need CODT to fix - in the example I quoted, putting someone on watch as OOD U/I without making sure he had the required knowledge can be fixed without millions of dollars spent to make him learn via trial by fire.

These ships were in 7th fleet and forward deployed, right? They got more than enough underway time to train the officers and crew.

 

[BigRed389]

'I need more CODT' is the battle cry of every CO of an underperforming crew. Almost always there are underlying issues with the effectiveness of training that doesn't need CODT to fix - in the example I quoted, putting someone on watch as OOD U/I without making sure he had the required knowledge can be fixed without millions of dollars spent to make him learn via trial by fire.

These ships were in 7th fleet and forward deployed, right? They got more than enough underway time to train the officers and crew.

7th Fleet allegedly has had many issues across the board, and yes, underway time isn't one of them.

Their rigid adherence to meet demanding OPTEMPO stretched (and probably broke in many places beyond just the known incidents) time for maintenance, redlines in operable equipment, Fit/Fill in manning, time for off ship training, etc. Add the fact they were called to surge CRUDES every time China or North Korea sneezed wrong, and that puts further strain on an already demanding model.

It is not just an "O" problem though, it extends down to the Chiefs and blueshirts as well. Chief's Mess technical and procedural mastery is not where it once was. Blueshirts arrive requiring significant training time in order to become capable.

That said, adding some CODT is, IMO, still essential when we rely on an OJT training and qualification model. The lack of white space to apply directly to training is why so much PQS just gets pencil whipped. Couldn't tell you how many PQS line items I had signed with nothing more than a quick verbal discussion because "you'll never actually get to see/do that."