USS Fitzgerald collision in C7F

[Spekkio]

7th Fleet allegedly has had many issues across the board, and yes, underway time isn't one of them.

Their rigid adherence to meet demanding OPTEMPO stretched (and probably broke in many places beyond just the known incidents) time for maintenance, redlines in operable equipment, Fit/Fill in manning, time for off ship training, etc. Add the fact they were called to surge CRUDES every time China or North Korea sneezed wrong, and that puts further strain on an already demanding model.

It is not just an "O" problem though, it extends down to the Chiefs and blueshirts as well. Chief's Mess technical and procedural mastery is not where it once was. Blueshirts arrive requiring significant training time in order to become capable.

That said, adding some CODT is, IMO, still essential when we rely on an OJT training and qualification model. The lack of white space to apply directly to training is why so much PQS just gets pencil whipped. Couldn't tell you how many PQS line items I had signed with nothing more than a quick verbal discussion because "you'll never actually get to see/do that."

The collisions were due to a fundamental skill/knowledge gap wrt practical application of the nautical rules of the road among the wardroom, which is fueled by a qualification and continuing training program that does not build and enforce the right level of competence. The collisions are entirely on the officers. This responsibility is why we get paid so much money. In the case of the McCain, this poor standards in the qualification process trickled down to junior enlisted watchstanders. Somewhere there is a qualifying officer who signed that Helmsman's final signature to put him on the watchbill.

The practical application of the rules of the road is not this obscure skill that requires a CODT. Nor is operating the engines. For two ships that were forward deployed and frequently underway, they should have had some of the best knowledge and experience in the fleet in these areas. They don't because the SWO community doesn't have standards.

CO's have discretion to waive/modify PQS signatures that are not applicable or don't fit ship's schedule. There's nothing wrong with that process. That's not why the collisions occurred.

Until the SWO community owns the problem, it will recur. Scapegoating the goat locker and saying that there were inadequate resources to do training on the application of the RoR is not owning the problem.

 

[Jim123]

CO’s need more discretionary time at sea to build wardroom ship handling skills.

I think you and @Spekkio are saying almost the same thing- the need for real, enforced standards and the need for resources to realistically meet those standards (discretionary time at sea for ULT, not just underway time).

The legal concept that I think applies to these mishaps and the surface navy is res ipsa loquitur. The fact that we have crashed or run aground so many ships is proof that we have been lying to ourselves. I find it laughable, tragic, and disgraceful that our admirals can say, with a straight face, that we are fulfilling complex missions like theater deterrence and ballistic missile defense when we have clearly proven our inability to do basic things like drive the ship.

 

[Spekkio]

I think you and @Spekkio are saying almost the same thing- the need for real, enforced standards and the need for resources to realistically meet those standards (discretionary time at sea for ULT, not just underway time).

Not quite. I don't think that a lack of CODT is why the officers on the McCain and Fitzgerald didn't know how to apply the nautical rules of the road. Both of these ships spent ample time underway to build not just competence but expertise in this area through qualification and training programs that would be backed by tons of on board experience. Except the quality of the qualification process is shitty and they took an 'ain't nobody got time for that' attitude toward continuing training.

Stated another way: You can give ships all the CODT in the world and it won't make a difference because the systemic issue will still be there.

The 'we don't do that because we're forward deployed' mentality crept into areas that it shouldn't have.

There are ships that need more CODT. They tend to be fresh out of a major upkeep.

 

[Jim123]

So what you're telling me is that a lot of our OODs are like the Florida drivers of the high seas...

 

[AllAmerican75]

The collisions were due to a fundamental skill/knowledge gap wrt practical application of the nautical rules of the road among the wardroom, which is fueled by a qualification and continuing training program that does not build and enforce the right level of competence. The collisions are entirely on the officers. This responsibility is why we get paid so much money. In the case of the McCain, this poor standards in the qualification process trickled down to junior enlisted watchstanders. Somewhere there is a qualifying officer who signed that Helmsman's final signature to put him on the watchbill.

Please tell me, how do you translate book knowledge into real world applicable skill? Practice. We can and do drill COLREGs knowledge constantly, from SWOS/BDOC, monthly on the ship, and even test that knowledge requiring over a 95% (IIRC) to pass. Guess what, the guys and gals who scored perfect scores on those tests usually couldn't recognize CBDR, fishing vs trawling, or not-under-command situations when it counted. Why? Because they didn't spend enough time on the bridge with their heads outside of the COLREGs book or a gouge sheet working on actually applying the knowledge. But boy, they could quote chapter and verse verbatim, down to the very minutia of how big lights were supposed to be.

The practical application of the rules of the road is not this obscure skill that requires a CODT. Nor is operating the engines. For two ships that were forward deployed and frequently underway, they should have had some of the best knowledge and experience in the fleet in these areas. They don't because the SWO community doesn't have standards.

You're right, it's not. But it requires practice and repetition over and over again which requires white space for training and practice in the schedule. Also, you need competent senior officers around to provide guidance and to critique performance. Do we just let our esteemed Airdale brethren climb into an aircraft alone the first day of Primary because they aced the written tests? No. Then why should we expect the same thing for SWOs?

CO's have discretion to waive/modify PQS signatures that are not applicable or don't fit ship's schedule. There's nothing wrong with that process. That's not why the collisions occurred.

The collisions didn't occur because the CO waived the knowledge check portion on how to maneuver with bow thrusters, but instead because those JOs on deck watch and Dept Heads in CIC were not competent enough or practiced enough to be able to apply the information they had. This is a problem throughout the Surface Fleet. Add in the fact that many are so tired that they are struggling the entire watch to stay awake, and you have a massive accident waiting to happen. It literally could have been any ship out there.

Until the SWO community owns the problem, it will recur. Scapegoating the goat locker and saying that there were inadequate resources to do training on the application of the RoR is not owning the problem.

You've completely missed the point.

 

[BigRed389]

Not quite. I don't think that a lack of CODT is why the officers on the McCain and Fitzgerald didn't know how to apply the nautical rules of the road. Both of these ships spent ample time underway to build not just competence but expertise in this area through qualification and training programs that would be backed by tons of on board experience. Except the quality of the qualification process is shitty and they took an 'ain't nobody got time for that' attitude toward continuing training.

Stated another way: You can give ships all the CODT in the world and it won't make a difference because the systemic issue will still be there.

The 'we don't do that because we're forward deployed' mentality crept into areas that it shouldn't have.

There are ships that need more CODT. They tend to be fresh out of a major upkeep.

The accidents happened IAW the Swiss cheese model.

Only FTZ was a RotR problem. Even there, there was a TAO, a SUWC, lookouts, a EOSS camera operator, a CICWO, etc.
JSM was a helmsman "operator error" problem. They were operating IAW the RotR up until they lost control of steering. What was so important they needed to cross deck that helmsman from another ship? Why are there so many different bridge configurations in the Surface Force?

And yes, the problems extend to more than just the ships. There is room for improvement in off ship entities to do better. I have seen plenty of problems with the level of "expertise" provided by visitors who are supposed to either provide training or certification for a ship.

As for CODT, would it have helped? Probably not directly. But CODT is really just code for white space in a schedule. It means leave me alone for a bit so I can actually train instead of jumping from one cert, or inspection, or mission to another. Ships basically don't get that now...the Fleet schedulers always have something else in mind.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

It means leave me alone for a bit so I can actually train instead of jumping from one cert, or inspection, or mission to another.

The one evident solution is to strip shoe URL corps off any engineering duty, i.e. to emulate Royal Navy practice. AFAIK, there is AMDO in every deployed NavAir squadron and there isn't a sole EDO on a deployed DDG. As one retired RN admiral had pointed out meaning USN comparable submarine practice, "they (USN submarine "coners") are too much concerned with their nuclear boiler behind them and thus often miss the needed tactical mastery".

 

[Gatordev]

And yes, the problems extend to more than just the ships. There is room for improvement in off ship entities to do better. I have seen plenty of problems with the level of "expertise" provided by visitors who are supposed to either provide training or certification for a ship.

Not having anything to do with C7F, but this reminds me when ATG was onboard an underway with the ship we were about to deploy on. No one was really sure why they were there, as they didn't train anyone in the mission set we were practicing, had no training themselves in how to do it, and it was a mission that wasn't even owned or administered by the USN. Bonus points when they were "making sure" we were doing things a certain way in the helicopter. All in a one-day underway.

That whole day was just weird.

 

[Jim123]

My first impression of ATG Mayport was when we were providing helicopter services for a destroyer getting its cert for something or other. The crew had layed out the HIFR hose the wrong way and the carabiner link thingy was missing. Nobody from the ship's crew nor any of the ATG people noticed the mistakes nor–the cardinal sin–had any of them bothered referring to the pub.

In all fairness this was almost twenty years ago and it was only one thing, but you know what they say about first impressions...

 

[robav8r]

CODT, white space, whatever you want to call it. CO's need time at sea, away from ISIC supervision and oversight to just sail. A whole bunch of stuff will/would be fixed if that was reality. I understand the reasons why it is not. But it doesn't change the requirement and net benefit . . . .

 

[Griz882]

My first impression of ATG Mayport was when we were providing helicopter services for a destroyer getting its cert for something or other. The crew had layed out the HIFR hose the wrong way and the carabiner link thingy was missing. Nobody from the ship's crew nor any of the ATG people noticed the mistakes nor–the cardinal sin–had any of them bothered referring to the pub.

In all fairness this was almost twenty years ago and it was only one thing, but you know what they say about first impressions...

In the last 20 years we have un-invented fire. So, you no longer need to worry.

 

[AllAmerican75]

Not having anything to do with C7F, but this reminds me when ATG was onboard an underway with the ship we were about to deploy on. No one was really sure why they were there, as they didn't train anyone in the mission set we were practicing, had no training themselves in how to do it, and it was a mission that wasn't even owned or administered by the USN. Bonus points when they were "making sure" we were doing things a certain way in the helicopter. All in a one-day underway.
That whole day was just weird.

ATG often gets tossed the responsibility for every sort of training requirement for the ships. This is a function of the culture where we (the Surface Navy) make knee-jerk reactions to problems. Ships aren't trained adequately? Hand the job to ATG and do OJT. I guarantee no one put any thought into why they were sending ATG out there, and it's obvious ATG had no idea. Also, you have plenty of Chiefs at ATG who don't follow the manuals (sometimes rightly so) because "That's not the way we really do things," or the ever popular "This is the way we've always done it."

My first impression of ATG Mayport was when we were providing helicopter services for a destroyer getting its cert for something or other. The crew had layed out the HIFR hose the wrong way and the carabiner link thingy was missing. Nobody from the ship's crew nor any of the ATG people noticed the mistakes nor–the cardinal sin–had any of them bothered referring to the pub.
In all fairness this was almost twenty years ago and it was only one thing, but you know what they say about first impressions...

Things are better. In the last ten years or so, there's been a lot more emphasis on quality control of who they send to ATG. Unfortunately, there are always those clueless guys who make it through.

The one evident solution is to strip shoe URL corps off any engineering duty, i.e. to emulate Royal Navy practice. AFAIK, there is AMDO in every deployed NavAir squadron and there isn't a sole EDO on a deployed DDG. As one retired RN admiral had pointed out meaning USN comparable submarine practice, "they (USN submarine "coners") are too much concerned with their nuclear boiler behind them and thus often miss the needed tactical mastery".

That's not a terrible idea. There has been much discussion over the last hundred years since the decision to remove EDOs from most ships to go back to a model similar to most other nations where there are actual engineers running the engineering department. Unfortunately, the EDO community is too small at the moment to support this requirement and do our primary job of running the surface and submarine fleet's acquisitions and maintenance programs.

 

[Spekkio]

Please tell me, how do you translate book knowledge into real world applicable skill? Practice. We can and do drill COLREGs knowledge constantly, from SWOS/BDOC, monthly on the ship, and even test that knowledge requiring over a 95% (IIRC) to pass. Guess what, the guys and gals who scored perfect scores on those tests usually couldn't recognize CBDR, fishing vs trawling, or not-under-command situations when it counted. Why? Because they didn't spend enough time on the bridge with their heads outside of the COLREGs book or a gouge sheet working on actually applying the knowledge. But boy, they could quote chapter and verse verbatim, down to the very minutia of how big lights were supposed to be.

1. Both of these ships had plenty of underway time to practice the practical application of the rules of the road (and to operate their steering systems).
2. Neither of these ships had wardrooms that could ace a RoR exam.
3. The SWO community writ large still can't ace a ROR exam according to a recent news article.

Let's talk about what actually happened and not a false dichotomy of some fictitious qualified OOD who can ace a written exam but can't apply those skills on watch just that you made up to try to prove a point. What is actually going on is that the SWO community is routinely putting people on watch who have inadequate knowledge to be there.

But it requires practice and repetition over and over again which requires white space for training and practice in the schedule. Also, you need competent senior officers around to provide guidance and to critique performance. Do we just let our esteemed Airdale brethren climb into an aircraft alone the first day of Primary because they aced the written tests? No. Then why should we expect the same thing for SWOs?

Again, these incidents didn't occur while conducting an infrequent mission set. We're talking about basic navigation that is exercised every single time a ship gets underway.

The collisions didn't occur because the CO waived the knowledge check portion on how to maneuver with bow thrusters, but instead because those JOs on deck watch and Dept Heads in CIC were not competent enough or practiced enough to be able to apply the information they had. This is a problem throughout the Surface Fleet.

This is the thesis of my argument two posts ago.

You've completely missed the point.

No, I think you've missed the point. These two ships had all the resources necessary to ensure their wardrooms were experts at applying the rules of the road. You want to point to other issues discovered in the comprehensive review then great, but let's not pretend like they caused the collisions.

 

[Spekkio]

The accidents happened IAW the Swiss cheese model.

In the 'swiss cheese' model or 'switch' model, the OOD has his own hole or switch. You can put the CO in there, but that's only available if he's called in time.

Only FTZ was a RotR problem. Even there, there was a TAO, a SUWC, lookouts, a EOSS camera operator, a CICWO, etc.
JSM was a helmsman "operator error" problem. They were operating IAW the RotR up until they lost control of steering.

That's not what the Comprehensive Review says on page 13:

"Primary causes of the collision were leaderships’ loss of situational awareness in a high traffic area and failure to follow safe navigational practices, coupled with watchstanders who were not proficient with steering control operations or engineering casualty response procedures. "

What was so important they needed to cross deck that helmsman from another ship? Why are there so many different bridge configurations in the Surface Force?

Because the Navy doesn't have the money (or the need) to pay an entirely full crew of sailors to sit in drydock, so it relies on ships cross-decking sailors to operational units. This is only a problem when you have a ship (or community?) that blazes off qualification cards and puts people on watch without adequately ensuring they understand the systems they are operating.

There is room for improvement in off ship entities to do better.

Of course there is. I never claimed otherwise. But they're not the root causes of the collisions. This is akin to discovering that someone has unpaid parking tickets when investigating a murder allegation. If the first response about these collisions is about how the ships were screwed by the man for not having enough time to train on the RoR or that their goat lockers were all jacked up, the salient lessons learned are being lost.

 

[Gatordev]

ATG often gets tossed the responsibility for every sort of training requirement for the ships. This is a function of the culture where we (the Surface Navy) make knee-jerk reactions to problems. Ships aren't trained adequately? Hand the job to ATG and do OJT. I guarantee no one put any thought into why they were sending ATG out there, and it's obvious ATG had no idea. Also, you have plenty of Chiefs at ATG who don't follow the manuals (sometimes rightly so) because "That's not the way we really do things," or the ever popular "This is the way we've always done it."

The issue was there was no requirement for them to be out there. The ship was already qualified. The aviation crews were already qualified (done separately through their own syllabus), and the ship and aviation crews were already qualified to work together (also done through their own syllabus). ATG just seemed to be there to "observe and make sure we were doing it right," but if we did something wrong, ATG had no authority to "un-qual" us.

Again, made extra special when they would talk about doing something during the in-brief and we (the aviation crews) would explain that's not a) how it actually would happen and b) how it's not legally allowed to be conducted.

Like I said, it was just weird.