Carrier Mishaps

[Harrier Dude]

The idle stop wasn't original equipment. The earlier model T-2B and C had several instances of people pulling the throttles off in the break. It was a simple matter of how hard you pulled back on them over a small detent as I recall.

A simple modification put a "bar" of some sort across the cutoff position that was put in place and released by a small plunger next to it. If you pulled up on the plunger, you could NOT get the throttles off. If you pushed down on the plunger, the bar recessed and you could get the throttles to go into the cutoff position.

When I was a student one of the first things that we had to do when we cleared the runway was "idle stop-disengaged". Engaging it was one of the last things we did before takeoff. The idea was that if you had a fire or a break failure you could get the throttles off faster if the idle stop was already disengaged.

At the boat (I was one of the first classes NOT to go to the boat in T-2s) I think the theory was more about the brake failure option, hence why it was an "optional" item.

 

[A4sForever]

.....I was one of the first classes NOT to go to the boat in T-2s.....

We never had any "throttle idle stop" in the ol' days ... and we didn't go to the BOAT in the T-2, either. Not because we didn't WANT to ... but rather because one of my classmates killed a guy on the deck when his hold-back fitting broke at MRT in tension (he stopped on the deck -- amazing he had such presence of mind as a STUD) .... we were holding overhead, waiting our turn when it happened and we Bingo'ed to the beach.

Sat and waited in P-Cola for @ 3 weeks while the powers that be figured out what they wanted to do - then "they" sent the top 25% of the class on to Texas and advanced without facing basic CQ. The next look @ the LEX was months later in the TA-4.

 

[Intruder Driver]

At the boat (I was one of the first classes NOT to go to the boat in T-2s) I think the theory was more about the brake failure option, hence why it was an "optional" item.

That's correct. The theory was that there are several scenarios on the boat (brake failure, emergency egress, etc.) where immediate shutdown is called for. Therefore, pilot option at the boat. After this mishap, the T-2 SOP was changed to engage the idle stop and the pilot could elect to disengage it after the first trap. I left Meridian as an instructor about nine months after the mishap and don't know what SOP changes occurred after that (I was in the A-4 squadron anyway and didn't follow its progress).

Of note, if you look at the part of the video shot through the two refueling T-2's, one has the lone stud and the other has two people. As I recall, that aircraft had the VT-4 XO in the front and the TRAWING SIX flight surgeon in the back.

 

[Harrier Dude]

That sucks. I would hate to have gone all the way out there and not got to CQ. At least I knew we weren't going to CQ in the Buckeye when we FCLP'd.

The TA-4 CQ class before mine had a guy almost kill his taxi director on the catapult. He was taxiing over the shuttle before getting the bridle engaged and going into tension and he saw the catapult guy giving the "wind it up" signal. The stud thought that the signal from the catapult guy (intended for the taxi director to tell the stud to keep it coming over the shuttle) was his "going into tension" signal and went to MRT. He scattered several of the deck crew and nearly ran a couple over. They showed us the video of that too (plus the guy himself was now in my class as a result of his experience).

I made it a point to go slowly up to MRT when going into tension until I was convinced that I wasn't going to go anywhere. Looking back, I think that the deck procedures were some of the most confusing and least explained parts of my initial CQ. I certainly felt lost on the deck after landing.

 

[Intruder Driver]

That sucks. I would hate to have gone all the way out there and not got to CQ. At least I knew we weren't going to CQ in the Buckeye when we FCLP'd.

The TA-4 CQ class before mine had a guy almost kill his taxi director on the catapult. He was taxiing over the shuttle before getting the bridle engaged and going into tension and he saw the catapult guy giving the "wind it up" signal. The stud thought that the signal from the catapult guy (intended for the taxi director to tell the stud to keep it coming over the shuttle) was his "going into tension" signal and went to MRT. He scattered several of the deck crew and nearly ran a couple over. They showed us the video of that too (plus the guy himself was now in my class as a result of his experience).

I made it a point to go slowly up to MRT when going into tension until I was convinced that I wasn't going to go anywhere. Looking back, I think that the deck procedures were some of the most confusing and least explained parts of my initial CQ. I certainly felt lost on the deck after landing.

As CQ lead safes, we used to joke that there was more brain activity in a dead person than in a SNA's brain during his first look at the back of the boat.

 

[Harrier Dude]

I think that there was TOO MUCH activity in my brain my first time at the boat. Nothing coherent or constructive, mind you, just lots of thoughts and sensory overload. My mind was racing like crazy. Frankly, I was just really happy to be aboard without killing myself or anybody else.

It got better, though!

 

[badger16]

This is the reason I come to this site. Amazing information from some salty guys. Just trying to take it all in. Amazing discussion guys!

 

[A4sForever]

.....we used to joke that there was more brain activity in a dead person than in a SNA's brain during his first look at the back of the boat.

I've done some stuff, seen some more stuff, and been to a lot more places than I can count ... but getting married @ 22 years of age and initial day CQ on the LEX are the only two times I can say that everything was just a blur ....

 

[bunk22]

Re: the silver suit, I don't remember the particulars, but she was held accountable.

Re: the follow-on MIR, I don't recall how it was 'labeled,' but it was somewhere between a JAG and an MIR, for lack of better clarification, and it came about because of likely lawsuits that were trying to lay blame on the civilian contractors (a spoon and a rolled up piece of aluminum foil were found inside the throttle quadrant, which is why the 'first MIR' also gave a stuck throttle as a possible cause to his being slow, and one reason the contractor was targeted.).

One of the pieces that helped us in the sim reconstruction was the recollection of dash three and four (the MP was dash two) that when he broke and they scanned their guages, they were 30-40 kts faster than the briefed break airspeed. The MP had a reputation of coming into the break during FCLPs faster than briefed. He also had told some of his fellow studs that he wasn't going to engage the Idle Stop, which was an SNA's perogative at the ship, though mandatory ashore. If you take the 'break' airspeed and slam the throttles back, inadvertantly shutting one down, and then bring the throttles back up to their 'memorized' position, it's right about the groove that you go fully into the underpowered position, and also explains the yaw and right drift. There were some other factors, but I'd rather discuss them offline.

Conclusion? He was the major reason for the mishap. A little too cocky in close, as an lSO might say.

It sounds like there was no hard evidence that he shut the engine down...by that I eman, physical or mechanical proof from the wreckage itself. Usually there's an EI to determine if there was any mechanical issue with the aircraft. Again, I wonder why all this is being left out in the lesson learned debrief. Important to understand and learn all lessons from a tragic mishap, even though we don't fly the mighty Buckeye anymore (except VT-86 but they don't go to the boat).

 

[Intruder Driver]

It sounds like there was no hard evidence that he shut the engine down...by that I eman, physical or mechanical proof from the wreckage itself. Usually there's an EI to determine if there was any mechanical issue with the aircraft. Again, I wonder why all this is being left out in the lesson learned debrief. Important to understand and learn all lessons from a tragic mishap, even though we don't fly the mighty Buckeye anymore (except VT-86 but they don't go to the boat).

Bunk, let me clarify. I wasn't on the initial MIR. However, I assisted with the follow-on investigation. There was evidence that the right engine wasn't at full power at impact, which is what drove the stuck throttle theory, and the left engine was at full power, which explains why he was drifting right. Keep in mind, the natural tendency of a CV approach is to drift left, not right, since the landing area is moving left to right.

In the sims, when we put both of the Tubby Two's engines to full power at his fuel weight (assuming one wasn't shut down or there was no stuck throttle), it required a deliberate effort to make it depart in the manner it did. A very deliberate effort.

It sounds like the lessons being taught in the CQ phase attributed to this accident are very good ones and that is the whole purpose of NATOPS. However, there were a ton of lessons that came out of it at the time that may have, with time, fallen by the wayside.

For example, no student ever disclosed, prior to the accident, that the MP bragged about his break speed at the outlying field, though almost all of his classmates relayed it to the board. The LSO's got dinged for not being more vigilant in harnessing the bravado of SNA's in this stage. For all who have been in this stage, I'd wager the majority of us grew bigger balls with each successful FCLP period. I know I did, though they shrunk to the size of raisins when I rolled behind the ship for the first time. I think it was a side effect of my sphincter tightening up.

Another major SOP change for the CV itself was requiring a properly clothed 'silver suit' and, depending on the weather conditions, a 'ready' backup to relieve the primary one on hot, humid days.

For the CQ det, it became a major issue because the MP's fiancee had driven to Pensacola to meet him upon his return, so she had to be located and sequestered so she didn't hear any tough details until his parents could be notified.

We'll have a beer one day and I'll tell you the interesting stuff.

 

[Nose]

I've done some stuff, seen some more stuff, and been to a lot more places than I can count ... but getting married @ 22 years of age and initial day CQ on the LEX are the only two times I can say that everything was just a blur ....

AMEN! I was so scared of running over someone that I put as much leg as I could into holding the brakes every time I stopped. I was in tension on CAT I on Lex, having already saluted and about .1 seconds from taking the shot when I realized that I was still standing on the brakes with all I was worth.

Wouldn't have mattered as far as the shot was concerned. I was going flying no matter what. Only question was whether I would leave skid marks on the deck (and in my U-trou) or not.

Brain dead indeed...

 

[MasterBates]

Must be why the T-45 releases the brakes FOR you on the Cat. Provided you got the switchology with the launch bar right.

 

[Intruder Driver]

I've done some stuff, seen some more stuff, and been to a lot more places than I can count ... but getting married @ 22 years of age and initial day CQ on the LEX are the only two times I can say that everything was just a blur ....

Amen to that. I was married, for the first time, at 22 and I recall it more as a "WTF am I doing" moment. However, CQ on the LEX in T-2's seemed to be over in 10 minutes. It was a blur and a flash at the same time.

 

[bunk22]

We'll have a beer one day and I'll tell you the interesting stuff.

Well, I certainly hope so :icon_smil

 

[A4sForever]

Bunk, let me clarify......We'll have a beer one day and I'll tell you the interesting stuff.

Excellent debrief; especially given the limitations of this forum.