Pretty sure that is the standard of how we measure the mishaps, by rate and not by number.
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ERAU Mishap in Daytona
- Thread starter BACONATOR
- Start date
Pretty sure that is the standard of how we measure the mishaps, by rate and not by number.
I don't have all the numbers at home, but you just tasked my Safety O tomorrow by proxy. That's expert level hinge!
In the interim, I'll offer this - it depends how you define historical norms. We've had things like tactical hard decks and bathtub readiness resourcing profiles for a lot longer than sequestration has been around. Bottom line, our annual mishap rates over the past decade has had ups and downs that seem independent of the period where sequestration had an impact.
So, I'm now looking at the 10 year class A flight mishap rates (per 100K flt hours). Not only are we (Navy) well within historical norms this year, but there's no discernable up-trend post sequestration. Interestingly, the Marines' 10 year class A average is 2.4 times higher than Navy's. That's always been the case, to my recollection. Probably some cultural, resourcing and mission/platform specific factors at work there.
Is your Safety O aware of where the genesis for this tasking originated? Inquiring minds want to know ....
For the record, sir, I didn't task him, you did.
But thanks for the info regardless.
But thanks for the info regardless.
Hard to make an educated guess when the causes aren’t yet known. It could be anything. So, I’ll counter your cultural, resourcing, and mission/platform hypothesis with one of my own. I think all the recent Marine mishaps were caused by bees.
(Smilies in effect)
I have yet to see any brief or SIR related to mishap that was specifically attributed to Marine culture or resourcing that was cited as a causal factor to a mishap. Non withstanding the potential command climate issues are present in all squadrons that deal with mishaps. TMS and mission differences are definitely a valid factor.
Would a senior USMC member even consider a resourcing causal factor because of the USMC culture? You could write a few PhDs on that one alone...
Command or service culture can influence behavior in a lot of ways that are oftentimes causal factors. Resourcing, as has been hinted at several times in this thread, can affect currency/proficiency as well as a variety of material and maintenance related factors.
That's a valid point, but the elements brought up in the article aren't HFACS analyses. They are basic facts like: pilots who had well below annual minimum monthly hours, hadn't flown NVD in 6 months, etc. Basic facts that I think most with experience flying complex missions like that can infer significant readiness problems. Also, Skipper relieved a few days before mishap, and command climate at the time. And that was an example I brought up only because I hadn't read that particular SIR so I felt I could discuss without breaking privilege. The ones I have read, showing glaringly similar issues in many other mishaps.
To expound on my "yes" comment, I think the issue isn't looking at one particular metric through a soda straw. It's about a comprehensive picture. I believe our mishap rate is on a significant rise, not just class A. If your slide deck has that, I'd be curious to know, or perhaps I can task your safetyO by proxy in my last days as a JOPA member and really win the game...
Anyway, the beauty of safety, is can use non-class-A mishaps as part of a trend analysis as well. Many class C mishaps could just as easily have been class A, and any upward trend is a bad sign. A random example: perhaps a lack of resources, or increased optempo leads to a class C due to maintenance (human) error. It wasn't a pilot error due to lack of flight time, training, command influence, but the resource-constrained environment and the "get it done" nature, pushes maintenance to a place where someone makes a mistake, the aircrew has an EP, and damages the aircraft on the way back... or even something as simple as running a cart into the jet. If that sort of mishap rate was higher than normal, I don't think anyone responsible would say that is normal and because class As are on par, we're good (not to put words in your mouth).
I share your concern about the rise of class C mishaps, and agree that general fatigue and deferral of maintenance of all kinds of platforms across the force can be a significant contributor to that problem. This is where command (and service) climate can be crucially important in establishing expectations of our aircrew and maintainers to mitigate those risks.
There will always be perceived (and real) pressure to get the mission done. Leaders at all levels, from CDIs and LPOs up through Flag Officers, have to set the tone that our troops and aircrew have top cover, especially when the weight of deployed ops is a factor. My mindset while deployed was still very much that no sortie was worth hurting a Sailor or breaking a jet. Operational necessity has a pretty broad range of interpretation. That's a big part of setting the command climate.
There will always be perceived (and real) pressure to get the mission done. Leaders at all levels, from CDIs and LPOs up through Flag Officers, have to set the tone that our troops and aircrew have top cover, especially when the weight of deployed ops is a factor. My mindset while deployed was still very much that no sortie was worth hurting a Sailor or breaking a jet. Operational necessity has a pretty broad range of interpretation. That's a big part of setting the command climate.
I am genuinely interested in your thoughts and views about how Marine leadership is causing a higher mishap rate in Marine Air. Not saying it’s not true, but that’s a rather bold assertion by saying our Commanders are too proud to save their own pilot’s lives with out backing it up with some hard facts besides anecdotal comments.
I’ve never nor have most of my peers across multiple TMS been put in a position that called into question safety culture in Marine Air atleast without having an avenue to address our concerns. Usually the issue was taken out of our hands if it ever (rarely) got to that point. We don’t fly unsafe aircraft and we adhere to all safety/currency requirements to the max extent possible. Even to our own detriment at times. If you want to talk about the lack of resources, then you should start at the congressional funding levels because I would think that every Marine commander would give each pilot his own aircraft to train with everyday if he could. Most of that however is out of the control of commanders. I’m not saying my service is infallible but from “deck plate” level, I’m just not seeing it.