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Europe under extreme duress

ChuckMK23

FERS and TSP contributor!
pilot
Along the topic of Starlink and UKR mil use, Starlink was approved for installation aboard all CVN's - here's a Navy PA pic of the antennae installed on Lincoln

456457854_799832889031237_2054581748345991774_n.jpg
 

ChuckMK23

FERS and TSP contributor!
pilot
US policy needs to step up and help UKR get over the goal line - and help drive destruction of the Russian political apparatus - and the associated pieces of Russian culture that created it.

Russia is a military paper tiger. There is no "there" there - that should be obvious now.

A short, intense mil engagement with direct support of US/NATO might be the trick.
 
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whitesoxnation

Well-Known Member
pilot
Contributor
US policy needs to step up and help UKR get over the goal line - and help drive destruction of the Russian political apparatus - and the associated pieces of Russian culture that created it.

Russia is a military paper tiger. There is no "there" there - that should be obvious now.

A short, intense mil engagement with direct support of US/NATO might be the trick.
A paper tiger with lots of nukes and other ways to make people outside Ukraine feel a lot of pain.
 

cfam

Well-Known Member
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
US policy needs to step up and help UKR get over the goal line - and help drive destruction of the Russian political apparatus - and the associated pieces of Russian culture that created it.

Russia is a military paper tiger. There is no "there" there - that should be obvious now.

A short, intense mil engagement with direct support of US/NATO might be the trick.
Legitimately curious, what would you consider a “short intense mil engagement” that would actually convince Russia to come to the negotiating table? Do you really think that Putin wouldn’t consider the nuclear option if there was an existential threat to his regime?
 

taxi1

Well-Known Member
pilot
Legitimately curious, what would you consider a “short intense mil engagement” that would actually convince Russia to come to the negotiating table? Do you really think that Putin wouldn’t consider the nuclear option if there was an existential threat to his regime?
I think the existential threat should come from internal to his regime. Our job is to help Ukraine convince the rest of Russia that invading Ukraine was really stupid.
 

hscs

Registered User
pilot
US policy needs to step up and help UKR get over the goal line - and help drive destruction of the Russian political apparatus - and the associated pieces of Russian culture that created it.

Russia is a military paper tiger. There is no "there" there - that should be obvious now.

A short, intense mil engagement with direct support of US/NATO might be the trick.
I give this plan a 32.33% (repeating of course) chance of survival of the human race.
 

Griz882

Frightening children with the Griz-O-Copter!
pilot
Contributor
Legitimately curious, what would you consider a “short intense mil engagement” that would actually convince Russia to come to the negotiating table? Do you really think that Putin wouldn’t consider the nuclear option if there was an existential threat to his regime?
With reference to your last question, I don’t think Russia will pull the nuclear trigger. The Ukrainian offensive has made notable tactical gains and clearly exposes significant Russian military problems (nothing new) but still the Russians haven’t broken out so much as a Cold War tactical nuke. I simply don’t think they will. It’s one thing to holding things together internally (even with international sanctions) and another to be a global pariah. On the military side, I also think his missile force officers will ignore any launch order from Putin unless someone else launches first.

@taxi1 has it right, the crisis will come from within.
 

JTS11

Well-Known Member
pilot
Contributor
With reference to your last question, I don’t think Russia will pull the nuclear trigger. The Ukrainian offensive has made notable tactical gains and clearly exposes significant Russian military problems (nothing new) but still the Russians haven’t broken out so much as a Cold War tactical nuke. I simply don’t think they will. It’s one thing to holding things together internally (even with international sanctions) and another to be a global pariah. On the military side, I also think his missile force officers will ignore any launch order from Putin unless someone else launches first.

@taxi1 has it right, the crisis will come from within.
The safest place to be would probably be London, if the balloon went up. That's where their sidepieces, kids, and a bit of their wealth resides.

With regards to your last point, not sure we should test that hypothesis out (not saying you're wrong).

If RUS were to detonate a tactical nuke in UKR, I'm guessing the NATO response would be very severe, but non-nuclear. Doubt RUS would do that, but they like to use the possibility, as blackmail to the West, IMO.

It does seem that NATO countries are slowly removing restraints on the use of the weapons they supply to UKR. Germany seems to be the biggest pussies, though; while the UK is like "do what you will".
 

Hair Warrior

Well-Known Member
Contributor
With reference to your last question, I don’t think Russia will pull the nuclear trigger. The Ukrainian offensive has made notable tactical gains and clearly exposes significant Russian military problems (nothing new) but still the Russians haven’t broken out so much as a Cold War tactical nuke. I simply don’t think they will. It’s one thing to holding things together internally (even with international sanctions) and another to be a global pariah. On the military side, I also think his missile force officers will ignore any launch order from Putin unless someone else launches first.
None of these assumptions are supported by the facts or by our understanding of the Russian way of war.

We can’t assume that Russia won’t use a nuclear detonation/test as messaging. We can’t assume what effect tactical gains/losses of territory have on their nuclear use doctrine and red lines. We can’t assume that Russian leaders care whether or not the world sees them as a pariah. We can’t assume that military officers will refuse/disobey orders to launch.


This is a good article on Russian nuclear doctrine.
 

Griz882

Frightening children with the Griz-O-Copter!
pilot
Contributor
None of these assumptions are supported by the facts or by our understanding of the Russian way of war.

We can’t assume that Russia won’t use a nuclear detonation/test as messaging. We can’t assume what effect tactical gains/losses of territory have on their nuclear use doctrine and red lines. We can’t assume that Russian leaders care whether or not the world sees them as a pariah. We can’t assume that military officers will refuse/disobey orders to launch.


This is a good article on Russian nuclear doctrine.
Frankly, I can assume anything I please. That’s exactly what Ross is doing on the article you reference. I certainly wouldn’t hang my hat on what “our” understanding of the Russian way of war. Speaking on a purely academic/think tank level our understanding of Russia is currently caught between old school Soviet types, Russia as gangster nation types, and “New Russia” types…and they all disagree on what Russia can or will do.

Where I do disagree with Ross (and those in his school of thought) is on statements like this one from the article; “In 2014, Russia could have virtually guaranteed a decisive military victory over Ukraine by displaying its modern military advancements and dominance, sending multiple divisions across the border, supported by thunderous artillery and heavy bombers. It did not…” Ross is entirely mistaken here because it wasn’t a matter of simple escalation control by Putin it was simply that Russia could not display “military advancements and dominance, sending multiple division across the border, supported by thunderous artillery and heavy bombers.” Put simply the Soviet School types haven’t evolved with the times.

All of this is to say that there is hardly real consensus in the Ivory Tower over what Russia is capable of and what they might do. I happen fall into what some might call the “gangster nation” school wherein Putin uses the antique tools of of the former Soviet Union to bully smaller nations into doing his bidding. Putin is neither a Czar somehow genetically predisposed to a life-time fear of an invading west nor a hardened Soviet looking to defend the ideas of global communism. He is a powerful thug looking to steal what he can in the light of day while pointing his pistol at pearl clutching ladies. Is he dangerous? Sure he is. Does he sit atop a globally terrifying nuclear arsenal? Yes he does. Does that mean the world should let him have his way? Absolutely not, nor will his military chain-of-command allow him to destroy Russia to keep his power.

I disagree with @ChuckMK23 and his unleash the dogs of war” idealism. The current war is a local affair and can remain that way. We can help as we can, but it is up to the Ukrainians to win or fight on to a peaceful settlement. I do agree with @taxi1 that internal Russian turmoil is the fastest and best route to end the war (and flatten Putin for good) and that should be our tactical and economic focus while our long view strategy should be looking at ways to pull a still struggling post-Soviet Russia into the light.
 
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