Yeah... wasn't there a CAG-5 Hornet shot down in OIF?
And war with Iran... last thing we need is a repeat of the Vincennes...
Patriot was responsible for two blue-on-blue fratricides in Iraq during OIF and received friendly fire itself. The Patriot launches against blue forces resulted in 3 fatalities, two in a British RAF Tornado GR4A, the other in a F/A-18 Hornet.
March 24, 2003 - A Tornado was engaged by the Patriot battery when the system automatically mistakenly classified it as an anti-radiation missile (ARM), which is a threat typically engaged automatically by the system. The flight path of the Tornado took it directly over the Patriot battery and battery had had left the "ARM classification" protocol activated, despite the fact that Iraq had no ARMs. It was determined that the Tornado did not have its IFF transponder on, which could have prevented the tragic engagement.
March 26, 2003 - The next blue-on-blue was a reverse situation when the Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) of a USAF F-16 Falcon carrying HARM incorrectly identified the emissions of a Patriot battery (trying to lock onto the F-16) as an Iraqi SA-2 battery. The Patriot battery was in position to protect the 101st Airborne Division's Headquarters near the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT). The F-16 fired an AGM-88 HARM missile, which struck directly in front of the Patriot Radar Set, putting it out of action. The affected Patriot unit was forced to replace its radar set with another unit in the immediate area. The replacement radar set had not fully undergone a testing period after receiving its PAC-3 upgrade/enhancements, and later the same battery was responsible for the fratricide of the F/A-18 mentioned below.
April 2, 2003 - A F/A-18 Hornet was engaged when it was misclassified as a TBM. The Patriot battery engaged the Hornet in an automatic fire mode after the software, in conjunction with the Patriot radar, incorrectly classified the aircraft as a TBM inbound for the Karbala Gap region, where US Army ground forces were currently operating. The Tactical Control Officer and Tactical Director failed to check that the speed and altitude of the track were consistent with that of a ballistic missile because they left the control van to take cover leaving the missile in an automatic fire mode and the aircraft was engaged with a PAC-3. A second battery almost engaged another aircraft but checked their fire.
I agree with an Army sponsored after-action report statement that said:
"Every effort must be made to avoid autonomous fire units" and "Past exercises and tests run in SWA [Southwest Asia] indicate the percentage of aircraft that [are positively identified] remains too low. There are too many points of failure"
@Gatordev - maybe you guys have a secret handshake with these guys, but the fast movers and high, fast flyers are very skeptical of operating anywhere near them