Check. How about a C school (or similar) for VBSS, eligible to a certain subset of rates/designators who will likely be in a position to use them?
It occurs to me that, anecdotally, a lot of VBSS training appears to be just-in-time (JIT) training, on-the-job (OJT) training, and/or wheel reinvention.
We can debate the training duration, eligibility, location, and whether having the school would be required or optional for serving in a VBSS team. That's not the point. But any training to further professionalize the surface navy seems prudent to me, as an outside observer with no direct experience in it.
Right. My thinking is, make it a shore training after A school but before they get to a ship. Or, after leaving the ship (end of tour) but before getting assigned to your next ship. SEALs receive dive training during SQT before going to a platoon. Aviators receive flight training before going to the RAG.
Copy all. The Army's Sapper course is just 28 days. Jump school (Basic Airborne Course) is 21 days. Air Assault is even shorter, at 10 days.
A short-but-beneficial Navy VBSS course could be highly selective to get a quota for, and/or physically & mentally difficult to complete once enrolled, to weed out lower quality candidates and avoid being just a way to avoid duty.
COs can have autonomy to not necessarily staff their VBSS crews with only VBSS graduates; i.e. put non-grads into key VBSS positions and/or exclude VBSS school grads from their ship's VBSS team, at CO's discretion.
It's probably part of a larger discussion about specialization vs. generalization in the surface community.
To clear up some confusion: There is a complete VBSS pipeline that represents approximately 7 to 12 weeks of training depending upon the team member's position within the team. The VBSS program requires that a Sailor volunteer, have a Good Low on the PRT, pass a 2nd Class swim qual, and be at least a marksman with their weapon. The pipeline consists of Security Reaction Force Basic (SRF-B) training which is required of all topside watchstanders who are expected to provide security training for the ship or carry a weapon. Then Sailors attend Security Reaction Force Advanced (SRF-A) which serves as an initial introduction to close quarters tactics and trains Sailors to act as a shipboard QRF for force protection issues. Then they attend Non-Compliant Boarding School which is the meat and potatoes of VBSS training. It used to 4 weeks but has been shortened to 3 and will likely get shortened further as more skill sets are removed such as rappelling, at-sea container inspection, and a couple others. If a team member is designated as a Boarding Officer or Assistant BO, then they attend a weeklong Boarding Officer course which teaches the basics of how to plan and execute a VBSS mission and all of the admin that goes along with it. BOs and ABOs are also encouraged to attend a Maritime Interception Operations course which integrates the intelligence, Fleet level planning, and shipboard BO and ABO together for better commonality. This course is hard to get as it is only taught out of the Intel schoolhouse in Dam Neck and is not offered unless there is a demand. I was lucky to attend it due to slack in my WEPS pipeline during my PCS to the PC.
The instructors for Non-Compliant Boarding and SRF-A courses tend to be prior SEALs, EOD, MSRT, and Force Recon. They teach the same CQB and VBSS tactics the SEALs learn, with the exception of Level 3 and Level 4 boarding skills which often require helicopter insertion/extraction and/or active fire support. I will reiterate that the difference between regular Sailors and the SPECWAR/SOF boys is that they get a hell of a lot more time to practice this stuff than we do. The tactics don't really change or differ, but proficiency and capability to handle opposed boarding do. There is no reality where a non-schoolhouse-trained Sailor will be entrusted with the handling of a boarding mission when there are trained personnel onboard. Boarding operations are too dangerous and too much could go wrong or be fucked up from an administrative standpoint (You have to take into account custody of evidence, custody of detainees, duty to render aid, etc.) for the mission set to be left to untrained personnel (See HAL's comment about being lucky). Most VBSS missions are NOT gung-ho direct action counterterror operations but mainly C4ISR collection operations in order to obtain pattern of life, execute searches, and seize contraband. The direct action stuff requires SOF personnel, or at least a dedicated VBSS unit like USCG MSST or MSRT.
I betcha each ship's VBSS program probably reflects what's on the ISIC's inspection checklist- and not much else. And that is most definitely a community issue.
It's not supposed to be, but that's what it turns into. Most ships only perform VBSS training at DRRS-N mandated intervals so as to maintain "readiness." AT programs not so much because you constantly need to train personnel to fill watchbills as personnel PCS in and out of the command. VBSS programs can get away with it because of the tightly controlled nature of team personnel, long lead time of training, voluntary nature, and the fact that the mission set is really only performed on specific deployments to the HOA and Persian Gulf. Otherwise, we rely on SOF assets to perform MIO missions (See Captain Phillips et al). There are probably more ships who have a hard time manning their VBSS teams because Sailors don't want to volunteer and get sucked into one more collateral duty that could keep them on the ship past liberty call.
I remember reading an article in Proceedings written by a SEAL, arguing for more VBSS training to instill the warrior mindset and give small unit leadership opportunities, along with all of the direct reasons. 100% agreed. That one got tucked away in the good idea locker if I was to ever have an opportunity to be that guy in charge (still waiting
).
This has been advocated within the Surface community as well. It was one of the many arguments for the retaining the HVBSS Squadrons and Riverine Squadrons. These were company-sized units of regular Surface Sailors who were trained and used specifically for Level 3 boardings including air assault and heliborne tactics. They've even been used in opposed (Level 4) boardings when no SOF assets were available (Again, tactics don't really change, just proficiency). Sadly, the Navy's MIO, Riverine, and Green Water missions are being atrophied and defunded in favor of my billion-dollar warships and troubled weapons systems because the Admiralty refuses to admit that they are operationally important mission sets and can provide a large C4ISR payout (Not to mention their usefulness as an irregular warfare asset) for a small investment. They also teach young SWOs valuable leadership, navigational, and shiphandling skills that they just won't get any other way. IT is very likely that these mission sets will be relegated to the Reserves (like they were after Vietnam) in the next few years and then disposed of entirely.
Like mine warfare, expeditionary repair and salvage, and many other things, we will have to relearn these mission sets when actual war comes and we realize AEGIS and SM-6 won't save us from every threat or win wars.
