Yemen, in particular, needs to be "recalibrated."
"Shitshow in a dumpster fire" has been Yemen's normal mode of operation for most of its history. Even when the Brits ran the place, they mostly stuck with keeping Aden port and the BAM open and left the countryside to the locals. We're not going to bomb the place into being quiet like the Serbs, and I think its fair to say our appetite for open-ended counter-insurgency in the desert is pretty well used up for a while. Short of a seriously clamped-down naval blockade to keep all Iranian ships out, I'm not sure there's a viable solution.But how? The Saudis bombed it as much as they could and we are doing it semi-regularly now too. To say that place is a mess, and has been for decades, is an understatement.
Another interesting tidbit from ISW on the fallout from Syria. Sounds like a lot of Iranian leadership is reacting to Assad's collapse like we did to Afghanistan's:
Members of Iran’s armed forces and Iranian policymakers are increasingly disillusioned with Iran’s handling of the collapse of the Assad Regime. Iran observers have noted that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij members are critical of Iran's failure to intervene more decisively in Syria to support Assad against the opposition's surprise offensive, citing IRGC communication channels and interviews with IRGC members. An IRGC member stated that Syria was "crucial” for the Axis of Resistance, and "abandoning" Assad was a "betrayal" that would have serious consequences for Iran. Another member stated that the "[IRGC youth] will not forget the cowardice of the decision-makers." Iranian Parliamentarian Mohammad Manan Raisi stated that "after sacrificing six thousand martyrs and spending billions of tomans, we handed Syria over [in just one week]." These statements reveal dissatisfaction within Iran over its failure to support the Syrian regime, raising concerns about Iran's ability to sustain its influence via the Axis of Resistance. These frustrations—if they become wildly held among the security services and key Iranian leaders—could lead to the removal of top Iranian military commanders, including in the IRGC.